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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TEXAS CORPORATION
LAW-PART 11*
by
1. Leon Lebowitz**
VI.

CORPORATE FINANCE

A.

CorporateSecurities

Several of the 1973 legislative changes had an impact on the TBCA provisions relating to corporate securities. Some of these have already been discussed, such as the amendments concerning the incorporation by reference
procedure 90 2 and notation of restrictions on transfer as they affect share certificates,90 3 permitting variations of voting rights if preferred or special classes
may be issued in series 90 4 and affecting the class voting rights of holders of
such shares, 90 5 and recodifying the law relating to preemptive rights. 906
Others are briefly noted here along with several pertinent decisions.
Share Certificates. An amendment to section B of article 2.19907 allows
a corporation which is authorized to issue more than one class of shares or
which has chosen to limit or deny preemptive rights, in lieu of setting forth
such matters in full on the face or back of its certificates, the option of stating instead that the corporation will furnish without charge a full statement
of the relative rights, etc. of such classes or limitation or denial of preemptive
rights to any shareholder upon written request at the corporation's principal
place of business or registered office and that such information is also on file
in the office of the secretary of state.90 8 The change was suggested by a comparable Model Act provision, 90 9 and follows the contemporary practice that
the interests of economy and convenience reduce the need for the often
*

Editor's Note: This is the second of a two-part Article, Part I of which appears

in the Fall issue, 28 Southwestern Law Journal No. 4, pp. 641-764.

is continuous throughout the two parts.

Footnote numbering

Material cross-referenced to footnotes 1-901

will be found in Part I.

** B.A., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University. Professor of Law,
University of Texas at Austin.
902. See discussion in text accompanying notes 41-60 supra.
903. See discussion in text accompanying notes 557-70 supra.
904. See discussion in text accompanying notes 261-72 supra.

905. See
906. See
907. Ch.
art. 2.19(B)
908. The

discussion in text accompanying notes 273-96 supra.
discussion in text accompanying notes 713-74 supra.
545, § 10, [1973] Tex. Laws 1490, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
(1956).
new close corporation statutes have comparable provisions as to the legend

that must be placed on share certificates to note the existence of an agreement among
all the shareholders permitted by article 2.30-2 or a provision of the articles of incorpo-

ration giving a shareholder the option to dissolve the corporation. See TEx. Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-2(C), 2.30-5(B) (Supp. 1974). Any change in language on share
certificates made to take advantage of the amendment does not apply to or affect outstanding certificates, but must be stated on any certificates thereafter issued in connection with an initial issuance or subsequent transfer of shares. Id. art. 2.19(E) (Supp.
1974).
909. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 23 (2d ed. 1971)
ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d].

[hereinafter cited as
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microscopic reproduction of the preferred share contract and other required
legends on share certificates, and substitutes a statement that the desired information will be furnished on request or is available as a matter of public
record.910
Stock Rights, Options, and Convertible Indebtedness. A new provision has
been added to the TBCA expressly authorizing the corporation to create or
issue rights or options entitling their holders to purchase any of its classes
of shares or other securities or to create and issue convertible debt securities,
subject of course to any limitations expressed in the articles of incorporation. 911 The board of directors must approve the manner in which such
rights, options, or indebtedness is to be evidenced and their terms and conditions, including the fixing of purchase prices or conversion ratios and times
for exercising the underlying privileges. 9 12 While the issuance of such rights
and convertible indebtedness was probably sustainable under the more general powers conferred on corporations by the TBCA,90 8 the Bar Committee,
influenced no doubt by a comparable Model Act section, 91 4 felt that in view
of the increasing importance and usage of such securities it was desirable that
91 5
express statutory authorization for their issuance be enacted.
Fractional Shares. Article 2.20 dealing with fractional shares or scrip has
been amended to sanction additional arrangements for the handling of fractional shares. 91 6 As amended, the corporation is authorized to (1) issue fractional shares, (2) arrange for their disposition, (3) pay in cash their fair
value as of the time when those entitled to receive them are determined, or
(4) issue scrip to be used to acquire a full share. The change is designed
to accommodate the fairly common practice of designating an agent to buy
or sell fractional shares in behalf of shareholders receiving them, usually as
the consequence of exchanges of securities in acquisition situations, so that
917
the fractions can be combined into whole shares.
Considerationfor the Issuance of Shares. In its desire to provide creditors
or sometimes all the shareholders of corporations with an economic cushion
910. Id. 2.
911. Ch. 545, § 8, [1973] Tex. Laws 1489, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT

ANN.

art. 2.14-1 (Supp. 1974).

912. Id.

913. The power to issue convertible debt was seemingly authorized by TBCA art.
2.02(A)(9), the general contract and borrowing power that includes the issuance of
"notes, bonds, and other obligations," as well as article 2.15 dealing with the consideration for the issuance of shares. The same articles also apparently authorized the issuance of stock options and rights. See TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.02(A)(9),
2.12, 2.15 (Supp. 1974); 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 404 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORorZAz.TIONS].

914. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 20.
915. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.14-1, 3A TEx. REV. CrY. STAT. ANN. 44
(Supp. 1974).
916. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.20 (Supp. 1974), as amended by ch. 545, § 11,
[1973] Tex. Laws 1492.
917. Doty & Parker, Changes in the Texas Business Corporation Act and Related
Statutory Provisions, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 1009, 1015 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Doty & Parker].
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of sorts, as manifested by the "trust fund" doctrine,918 Texas law by both constitution 919 and statute9 20 has prescribed the quantity and quality of consideration for which shares are to be issued. 921 Given the variety of circumstances
under which stockholders acquire shares, it is not surprising that litigation occasionally arises concerning their issuance, or even that a statute as explicit
as the TBCA on the subject must be amended now and then to provide
further clarification.
The TBCA amendments on the subject are found in part in the new legis922
lation on stock rights, options and convertible indebtedness, just described.
Thus, in authorizing such securities, new article 2.14-1 provides that in the
absence of fraud the judgment of the directors as to adequacy of the consideration received for their issuance shall be conclusive. If shares, other than
treasury shares, that have a par value are to be issued on the exercise of
a right or option, the price received cannot be less than par value. Similarly,
conversion of indebtedness is not permitted if the corporation would receive
less than the minimum consideration required to be received for the issuance
of shares upon such conversion. The latter requirement is spelled out in a
new section E, taken directly from the Model Act, 923 that has been added
to article 2.15.924 When shares are issued upon conversion of indebtedness
or other shares, the consideration for their issuance is to be (1) the principal
sum of, and accrued interest, on the debt security being converted or the
stated capital represented by the equity security, (2) that part of surplus,
if any, transferred to stated capital upon such issuance, and (3) any additional consideration paid to the corporation at the time.
The courts, too, were asked to rule on the validity of the issuance of shares
in three recent cases, but in only one were sufficient facts stated to make
the court's holdings on the matter helpful as authority. In Austin Lake Estates Recreation Club, Inc. v. Gilliam,925 for example, the trial court's judgment included an order cancelling shares held by three members of the majority faction, based on jury findings they had been issued without full
consideration being paid to the corporation. One of the three contended his
shares had been acquired in exchange for the cancellation of two notes of
the club and to repay petty cash advances. The appellate court assumed
without deciding that the exchange of stock for the cancellation of the debt
would constitute valid payment for the shares92 6 but held nevertheless that
918. See discussion in text accompanying, and authorities cited in, notes 868-69 supra.
919. TEx. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
920. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16 (Supp. 1974).
921. See generally 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 391; Comment, Some Problems Raised by Issuing Stock for Overvalued Property and Services in
Texas, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 376 (1962).

922. See Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.14-1 (Supp. 1974) and discussion in text
accompanying notes 911-15 supra.
923. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 18, third paragraph.
924. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.15(E) (Supp. 1974), as amended by ch.
545, § 9, [1973] Tex. Laws 1490.

925. 493 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in

text accompanying notes 474-85 supra.
926. See, e.g., Robinson v. Malbeur Pub. Co., 272 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Ore. 1967)

(Oregon law); United States v. Cole, 90 F. Supp. 147, 150 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (dictum;
applying CAL. CORP. CODE § 1109(d) (West 195.5) allowing shares to be issued for
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there was other evidence (without stating it) that supported the jury's findings.
A similar result occurred in Gulf States Abrasive Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Oertel,927 an action by a former employee against his corporate employer for
the conversion of 25,000 shares of its stock he claimed it had wrongfully cancelled. The corporation asserted that the shares had been improperly issued
to him because the consideration given had been a promissory note, prohibited as consideration by the TBCA, 9 28 or else was to be paid for out of future
bonuses; the jury, however, found that the shares had been issued for the
plaintiff's prior work in organizing the corporation and getting its product on
the market and he was awarded a judgment on that basis. Again no evidence was stated to show the basis for the findings. The corporation tried
to invoke judicial estoppel to overturn the judgment because the plaintiff had
alleged under oath in a federal tax proceeding that he had not received the
shares in the taxable year in question or that if he had, they were not compensation or income to him. But because the corporation had failed to plead
estoppel, it was held to have waived the affirmative defense. Nor was the
plaintiff found to have consented to the issue being tried, even if he had not
objected to the admission of a certified copy of his sworn petition in the tax
case.
The one useful decision is Hatcher v. Jack Miller Milling Corp.929 The
suit was brought to enforce three promissory notes given by the defendant
to three separate corporations to purchase stock in each. He defended on
the basis that the notes were void because given for the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of shares and therefore prohibited by the Texas Constitution and the TBCA. 9 30 In affirming the judgment against him, the court held
that while under both the constitution and statute a promissory note cannot
constitute payment for the shares, the facts showed no shares were issued to
the defendant until he had made payment on the note in cash. Had he
tendered the balance that he owed on the notes he would have received the
shares he was entitled to; the corporations therefore were likewise entitled
to have the notes paid at which time they would issue the shares. In short,
the notes were valid and enforceable.
Under the facts stated, there can be no quarrel with the court's holding
which is in accord with the general rule.9 31 So long as the shares are not
"debts or securities canceled"); Richardson v. Graham, 45 W. Va. 134, 30 S.E. 92
(1898); 11 W.

FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW

OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§

5197

(perm. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS].
There appears to be no Texas authority in point, but cf. Jackson v. Gish, 440 S.W.2d
121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Hamilton, Corporations
and Partnerships,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 91, 106 (1970) (shareholders ratified issuance of shares to directors because they had worked without adequate
compensation for four years and corporation did not have sufficient cash to pay reasonable salary).
927. 489 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.,
discussed in text accompanying notes 576-79 supra.
928. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16(B) (1956).
929. 501 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
930. TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6; TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.16(B) (1956).
931. See, e.g., McCarty v. Langdeau, 337 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1960), error ref. n.r.e.; Zapp v. Spreckels, 204 S.W 786, 788 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galve-
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issued until paid for, the giving of a promissory note is analogous to a subscription for shares, which, depending upon its terms, is callable in install93 2
ments or in full at the discretion of the board of directors.
Redemption. The TBCA provides in some detail the procedure to be followed in redeeming shares, including the notice to be given holders of such
shares,9 3 3 but typically has no comparable provision for redemption of debt
securities. The redemptive process and the notices to be given are regarded
as a matter of contract between the issuer, the debt security holder, and probably the indenture trustee, and the terms of that contract govern redemption, 93 4 as one recent case brings out. In Terrell v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp.93 5 a debenture holder brought action against the issuer claiming
he had not been given reasonable notice of redemption and was therefore
damaged by being deprived of the opportunity to convert his debentures into
common shares and make a profit thereon. More specifically, he claimed
that notice of the redemption should have been mailed to him at his residence
in Houston or by published notice in a Houston newspaper. Under the terms
which appeared on the debenture, notice of the redemption was to be published twice in an "Authorized Newspaper" and sent by mail to each registered owner. It also provided that all debentures would have to be reregistered on or after December 1, 1960, or else become transferable by
bearer. Plaintiff, who had acquired his debentures in July 1960, did not reregister them and as a consequence did not receive the notice sent to holders
who had registered their debentures after the December 1, 1960, date. The
court held that the debentures were a form of contract whose explicit terms
were clear and unambiguous insofar as notice was concerned; 'thus, there was
no implied duty to give any other form of notice than was actually given to
holders who had not complied with the re-registration process.9 3 6 There being no duty owed and no duty breached 93 7 and the re-registration requireston 1918); McCoy v. Bankers Trust Co., 200 S.W. 1138, 1141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1918), error ref.; cf. World Oil Co. v. Hicks, 19 S.W.2d 605, 612, a!i'd, 34 S.W.2d 581
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1931), judgment affirmed. See generally 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS

§ 5196; 1, 2 I.

HILDEBRAND,

THE LAW

OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS

§§ 257, 283 (1942) [hereinafter cited as I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS]. A few
state statutes impliedly recognize the rule by providing that shares are not fully paid until any notes or checks given therefor have been paid. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 12:52
(C) (1969); MINN. STAT. § 301.18(3) (1969).
932. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.14(D) (1956); cf. Smoot v. Perkins, 195 S.W.
988 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1917).
933. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.08(A) (1956).
934. See, e.g.,

AMERICAN

BAR

FOUNDATION,

CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING

PROJECT,

INDENTURE PROVISIONS [FOR] ALL REGISTERED ISSUES § 1105
(1967). See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 497 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter
cited as BALLANTINE]; V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 176 (1972); W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1229,
2162 (4th ed. unabr. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CARY]; 4 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 91.02; 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2731; 19
MODEL DEBENTURE

id. §§ 9162-63.
935. 496 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
936. The corporation published the notice of redemption in the Wall Street Journal,
the New York Times, the Dallas Morning News, the Dallas Times Herald, and the
American Banker on seven dates within a span of twenty-four days. 496 S.W.2d at 672.
937. The court followed the ruling of the court of civil appeals for the First District
(Houston) in an unreported opinion involving essentially the same facts which it regarded as establishing the controlling law of the case. Lomas & Nettleton Financial
Corp. v. Terrell, No. 15,895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] April 13, 1972).
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ment not being so unreasonable or unfair as to require it be disregarded, the
9 38
plaintiff had no basis for his complaint.
B.

Dividends and Other Distributions

Restrictions on Surplus. Under the TBCA cash or property dividends are
payable only out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the
corporation;9 3 9 if the corporation has no earned surplus, arrearages on preferred can be paid out of unrestricted capital surplus.9 40 Similarly, the degree to which a corporation can repurchase its own shares is dependent in
most cases on the extent to which unrestricted earned, capital or reduction
surplus is available therefor. 941 These surplus accounts become restricted,
according to article 2.03(E), to the extent any form of surplus is used as
the measure of the corporation's right to repurchase its shares, and remain
restricted so long as and to the degree the shares are held in the treasury
and are not otherwise disposed of or cancelled. 9 42 However, because of the
manner in which certain financial terms have been defined in the Act, in
effect a double restriction was imposed on any surplus account used as the
basis for repurchase of shares. This came about by virtue of the definition
of surplus to mean the excess of net assets of the corporation over its stated
capital 943 and a corresponding definition of net assets to mean the amount
"by which the total assets of a corporation, excluding treasury shares, exceed
the total debts of a corporation." ' 944 For example, assume that a Texas corporation with total assets of $300,000, total debts of $100,000, $100,000 in
stated capital and $100,000 in earned surplus, decided to repurchase $30,000
of its own shares. To calculate the amount of surplus the corporation then
had, first the $30,000 had to be subtracted from the total assets, leaving a
balance of $270,000 in total assets. Next the $100,000 in total debts would
be subtracted from that sum, leaving $170,000 in net assets. The excess of
that -amount over the stated capital of $100,000 would then leave a balance
of only $70,000 in earned surplus. But according to article 2.03(E), since
earned surplus was used as the measure of the corporation's right to repurchase its shares, it became restricted by $30,000, thus leaving only $40,000
in unrestricted earned surplus available for payment of cash or property dividends.
This undoubtedly inadvertent result can be traced back to the Model Act
938. The court indicated that the plaintiff first learned of the redemption when he
attempted to collect his coupon which was returned unpaid in June 1969 "which date

was too late to redeem his debentures."

496 S.W.2d at 671.

This suggests the plaintiff

lost all rights to receive the redemptive price of his debentures which of course would

have been confiscatory; what was lost was his right to convert them into common stock
as shown by his suit which sought to recover the profit he would have made by timely
conversion.
939. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.38(A)(1) (1956).
940. d. art. 2.39(B).
941. Id. arts. 2.03(B), (C) (1956), (D) (Supp. 1974).
942. Once any of the treasury shares are disposed of or cancelled, the restriction as
to such shares is "removed pro tanto as to all of such restricted surplus not eliminated
thereby." d. art. 2.03(E) (1956).
943. Id. art. 1.02(A)(12).
944. d. art. 1.02(A)(10) (emphasis added).
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source for the TBCA definitions and provisions for repurchase of shares. 945
The 1950 version of the Model Act sought to eliminate treasury shares in
the ultimate calculation of surplus by excluding them from the definition of
net assets.9 48 'In 1953 the repurchase of shares section was revised to impose
the restriction approach 947 but without changing the net assets definition. Although the consequent double restriction was pointed out in an excellent arti9 48
it
cle on the financial provisions of the Model Act as far back as 1957,
was not until 1969 that the Model Act's definition of net assets was amended
to eliminate the "excluding treasury shares" language, 9 49 admittedly to "avoid
an unintended duplication of deductions upon the purchase by a corporation
of its own shares."9 50 The Texas revisers followed suit and through one of
95 1
the 1973 amendments have eliminated the troublesome phrase.
Dividends. In Ramo, Inc. v. English the Texas Supreme Court decided an
important case on whether advances made by a subsidiary to its parent corporation can be characterized as loans or dividends. 95 2 Briefly, the case
arose from a dispute between the sellers (the English family) and the purchaser (Ramo) and its parent (Telecom) of all the shares of stock of a motor
freight company (Red Ball). The action had been initiated by Ramo, Telecom, and Red Ball against the sellers seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the terms of the sale and asking for damages for alleged breaches
of warranty. The Englishes counterclaimed, alleging that each of twenty-four
separate acts of default on the plaintiff's part entitled them to accelerate the
945. The TBCA definitions were taken almost wholly from section 2 of the Model
Act. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 1.02, 3A TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. 13
(1956). On the other hand, the TBCA provision in article 2.03 on repurchase of shares
while derived from section 5 of the Model Act, including the language restricting surplus
when shares are repurchased, modified and somewhat expanded upon the section to as-

sure greater protection for corporate creditors. See Bailey, Safeguarding the Claims of
Creditors [Under the Proposed Texas Business CorporationAct], 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 470,
483 (1952).
946. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 2 (1950).
947. Id. § 5 (rev. ed. 1953).
948. Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70
HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1392 (1957). Professor Hamilton makes note of the same doubling effect in his treatise. 20 R. HAMILTON, TExAs BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 648, at
113. But see Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 637, 642 n.15 arguing the desirability of the double adverse effect.
949. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d, § 2.
950. Id. 1 2, at 37.
951. Ch. 545, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 1486, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.
art. 1.02(A)(10) (Supp. 1974). The Bar Committee explained the reason for the
change:

Since according to generally accepted accounting principles treasury shares
are not counted in the total assets of a corporation, a specific exclusion is
superfluous and confusing, since it may imply an additional deduction
upon purchase of treasury shares by a corporation. The amendment
makes clear that there is not a deduction from both total assets and 'net
assets' upon purchase of treasury shares. Creditors remain protected by
the restriction imposed by Art. 2.03 whenever surplus is used to acquire
treasury shares.
Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 1.02, 3A TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. 8 (Supp.
1974).

952. 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973). For detailed facts and an analysis of the decision
of the Dallas court of civil appeals, see Lebowitz, Corporations,Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 85, 111-12 (1973), discussing English v. Ramo, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 600
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), rev'd, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973).
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maturity of the purchase money notes executed by Ramo and praying for
judgment for the unpaid balance.
The case in both appellate courts turned largely on certain sizeable advances Ramo had had Red Ball make to it after the sale. 953 The Englishes
claimed that the advances contravened a covenant by Ramo in a noteholders'
security agreement that no cash dividends could be paid out by Red Ball except from profits accruing after the date of the agreement or that would reduce the continuing capital and surplus of Red Ball below their aggregated
amount as of a specified date. The trial court awarded judgment to the purchasers, denying the Englishes any recovery on their counterclaim, and disregarding a jury finding relating to the advances that found that each time Red
Ball transferred funds to Ramo, the latter had no intention that they be repaid. The Dallas court of civil appeals reversed on this issue, ruling that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding but that regardless
the advances constituted dividends as a matter of law in contravention of the
terms of the security agreement thereby permitting acceleration. Its rationale was that no notes had been given for or interest paid on the supposed
loans, that Ramo's use of Red Bal's funds without paying it interest had conferred a substantial economic benefit upon it that was equivalent to a dividend, and "that regardless of the form of the transaction, a distribution of
corporate funds to a controlling stockholder because of its stock ownership
and for its sole benefit, and repayable at its sole discretion, is a dividend insofar as the rights of creditors are concerned." 95 4 The court basically felt the
purpose of the dividend limitation in the security agreement was to prevent
Red Ball's financial position from being weakened while the notes remained
unpaid, as happened because of the advances, 95 5 and should not be circumvented by terming the withdrawals loans.
The supreme court reversed. It agreed with the Dallas court that a distribution of money or property to shareholders can constitute a dividend as a
matter of law even though it is not formally declared or designated as such
by the directors. 956 But as it read the record, the evidence did not establish
as a matter of law that the advances in question were dividends rather than
loans, although conceding the facts relied on by the Dallas court were "rather
persuasive." 9 57 The high court looked instead to other facts such as a recital
953. The sale was consummated on June 21, 1968. From the period of June 24,
1968, to October 1, 1969, Red Ball made cash advances to Ramo totalling $2,272,357.81,

including an initial advance of $1,500,000 made right after the sale. 500 S.W.2d at 462,

464.
954. 474 S.W.2d at 605.
955. In early 1970 Red Ball had to borrow $450,000 from two banks, paying interest
at 9%% per annum, and from September 1969 to March 1970 it also borrowed a

total of $1,425,000 from Telecom, evidenced by notes bearing interest ranging from 8' %
to 9Y2 %. 500 S.W.2d at 465.
956. This accords with the general American rule. See, e.g., Metropolitan Trust Co.
v. Becklenberg, 300 Ill. App. 453, 21 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1939); Grants Pass Hardware
Co. v. Calvert, 71 Ore. 103, 142 P. 569, 574 (1914); Sunseri v. Sunseri, 358 Pa. 1, 55
A.2d 370 (1947); cf. Tweedie Footwear Corp. v. Fonville, 115 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1938), error ref. See generally, e.g., CARY 1565; 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5350; D. KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 155, 278 (1941); 2
Mo. L. REv. 223 (1937).

957. 500 S.W.2d at 466.
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in Red Ball's minutes that the largest advance to Ramo of 1.5 million dollars
was to be a loan,958 the entries on the books of Red Ball and Ramo that
termed the withdrawals "advance receivable" and "advance payable to subsidiary," respectively, and the repayment of some of the advances and the
execution of notes in Red Ball's favor just before the trial. 959 Moreover, and
perhaps decisively, it was impressed with the fact that while the two principal
members of the English family had been in control of Red Ball they, too,
had caused it to make advances to themselves without interest and evidenced
only by entries on the books and that were not repaid until the night of the
sale.9 60 As to the Dallas court's basic ruling, quoted above, that a loan in
form can be treated as a dividend in substance when designed to circumvent
a limitation on dividend payments, the supreme court construed this as a
holding "that the advances are dividends within the meaning of the security
agreement even though they may be loans in the sense that Ramo was legally
obligated to repay on demand." 961 As thus reformulated the Dallas court's
holding contravened a basic rule relating to an acceleration clause, namely
that it should be strictly construed because of its harshness and that if any
reasonable doubt arises concerning its terms, it must be interpreted in a way
that avoids forfeiture and acceleration. 962 Here, as the high court saw it,
there was nothing to indicate that the parties intended the word "dividends"
to have any meaning other than its usual and ordinary usage. They made
no attempt to limit Red Ball's right to make loans to shareholders or to regulate the terms and interest rate of any that might be made. Having firsthand knowledge of their own withdrawals and advances, the two principal
sellers could have readily included a provision in the agreement to prohibit
loans to Ramo if they had wished that form of protection. But the agreement
spoke only of dividends and the term could not be given a broader meaning
to permit acceleration of maturity. Hence, if Ramo were legally obligated
to repay the advances, they could not be dividends within the meaning of
the security agreement as a matter of law.
As to the jury finding, it was immaterial whether Ramo intended to repay
the advances or not. If the transactions were bona fide loans and Ramo was
958. The minutes stated, in part, the announcement by the chairman that the next
order of business was to cause Red Ball to loan Ramo $1,500,000, and that a motion
was duly made, seconded, and unanimously adopted resolving "that the corporation loan
to Ramo, Inc., on an open account payable on demand, the sum of $1,500,000." Id.
at 464.
959. On April 15, 1970, shortly before the trial, Telecom advanced $1,400,000 to
Ramo which paid that amount to Red Ball on the advances. But this turned out to be
largely a bookkeeping transaction as Red Ball then used the proceeds to pay the
$1,425,000 obligation it had to Telecom. Id. at 465.
960. By the time of the sale the unpaid balance on the advances made by Red Ball
to H.E. English and O.B. English amounted to $1,684,359.69 which was repaid to Red
Ball the night of the sale, presumably out of the $4,000,000 down payment on the total
purchase price for Red Ball and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries of $15,500,000. Id.
at 466.

961. Id.

962. The court approved the approach and manner in which the rule was stated in
Motor & Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex. 276, 289, 302 S.W.2d 386, 394 (1957),
and Crumley v. Ramsey, 93 S.W.2d 191, 192-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936), error
ref.
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legally obligated to repay them, their legal effect would not be altered by
its intent not to repay. 63 There was, however, a fact issue raised as to the
genuine nature of the transactions as loans or dividends which could have been
resolved by the submission of an issue inquiring whether there was a subterfuge in the manner in which the loans were handled or that would let the
jury, upon proper instructions, decide if the advances were loans or dividends.
Unfortunately from the Englishes' standpoint, no such issue was requested
or given and thus they were deemed to have waived this independent ground
of recovery.
In summary, the essence of the supreme court's holding seems to be that
had the issue concerning the nature of the advances been properly submitted
to the jury and had it found they were dividends and not loans, there was
sufficient evidence to have supported its finding. But granting the issue may
not have been submitted in its ultimate terms, it is difficult to see why a finding that there was no intent to repay is not material in concluding what legal
effect is to be given to the parties' intentions and actions. This is especially
true since the critical question in characterizing a withdrawal of corporate
funds by shareholders as loan or dividend is whether there was any intent
to repay at the time of the withdrawal. 96 4 To say that if Ramo were legally
obligated to repay the advances they were loans and not dividends is to beg
the question, since, as the high court acknowledges, this is the basic difference
between the two. 9 65 What must be done is to examine the facts adduced
by the evidence to determine if the disputed transaction has the elements of
one or the other and then determine its legal consequences. On that score,
the Dallas court's reading of the facts and its conclusion that the advances
to Ramo although loans in form were constructive dividends seem sounder.
963. The court speculated that perhaps Ramo intended to cancel the indebtedness after the English notes had been paid and released, but that even if it did, this was not
enough to convert the advances into dividends within the meaning of the security agreement. 500 S.W.2d at 467.
964. A number of tax cases dealing with the issue of whether advances to shareholders are dividends rather than loans have held that the subjective intent of the parties
is the essential factor and that for a transaction to constitute a loan, intent that the moneys advanced be repaid must be apparent. E.g., Bayou Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850, 859 (5th Cir. 1971); Ogden Co. v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 223,
225 (1st Cir. 1969) (advances to parent by wholly-owned subsidiary); Commissioner
v. Makransky, 321 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1963); Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1963); Spheeris v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 928, 931
(7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1961); Tirza A. Cox, 56 T.C. 1270 (1971)
(payment by one affiliated corporation to another to discharge bank loan of controlling
shareholder); Charles A. Sammons, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,145 (1971) (advance between affiliated corporations benefitting controlling shareholders). See generally B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
7.05 (3d ed. 1971); J. CHOMMIE, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 182 (1968);
1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 9.07 (rev. repl. 1971); Bradford,
The Constructive Receipt of Dividends by Stockholders of Closely Held Corporations,
47 Ky. L.J. 17, 378 (1958-59); Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 207 (1956). For non-tax cases recognizing intent as a determinative element, see, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 199 F. 689, 697 (9th Cir. 1912) (withdrawals by principal stockholder carried on books as debit items); Oilwell Chem. & Materials
Co. v. Petroleum Supply Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 367, 148 P.2d 720 (1944); Central of
Ga. Ry. v. Central Trust Co., 135 Ga. 472, 69 S.E. 708, 719 (1910). See generally
BALLANTINE § 239.
965. 500 S.W.2d at 465.
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C. Repurchase of Shares

Legislative Changes. The right of the corporation to acquire its shares by
purchase was affected by two of the 1973 amendments. The first relates
to the authorization required when a corporation desires to use unrestricted
capital or reduction surplus as a basis for the repurchase of shares.9 60 Heretofore such repurchase has required approval by the board of directors and
by the holders of two-thirds of each class of voting shares.9 6 7 As amended,
the class voting requirement has been eliminated so that approval by the
holders of two-thirds of all the voting shares outstanding will suffice; moreover, the articles may provide for approval of this and other actions by the
vote of the holders of an even lesser number of shares if no less than a majority or more.968 In addition, action by the shareholders may be dispensed
with entirely if the articles so provide. 9 69 Finally, the authorization applies
9 70
to either a direct or indirect repurchase of shares.
The wisdom of these changes is somewhat dubious. The removal of the
class voting requirement removes a safeguard which preferred or other senior
classes of equity securities may have had to preclude the diminution of the
cushion represented by the capital surplus realized by the amount in excess
of par value paid for common shares,9 71 or through a reduction of the stated
capital contributed by such shares. 972 However, arguably even under the
former law, preferred would likely not have had the right -to vote on the matter or else could have protected itself against such contingency in the preferred share contract and for that matter still can. 973 And while allowing
the articles to deprive the shareholders of any vote at all on the matter undoubtedly expands the discretionary powers of management as to reacquisition of shares, the potential abuses of the repurchase power because of its
974
selectivity, as contrasted to the uniformity of distribution of dividends,
weigh heavily in favor of requiring shareholder approval. This is especially
true when no earned surplus is available to use as a basis for the repurchase.
On the other hand, since the directors are already permitted to make distributions in partial liquidation and to pay off arrearages in preferred from capital
966. Ch. 545, § 4, [1973] Tex. Laws 1488, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.03(D) (Supp. 1974).
967. Ch. 64, § 2, [1955] Tex. Laws 244.
968. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.08 (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
969. Id. art. 2.03(D); see Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.03, 3A TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. Ar. 28 (Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1013.
970. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.03(D) (Supp. 1974).
971. Id. arts. 2.17(A), (B) (1956).

972. E.g., by an amendment to the articles of incorporation decreasing the number
of outstanding shares or by reducing their par value, Id. arts. 4.03(B)(4), (5), or in
the case of shares without par value, by a statement filed with the secretary of state
reducing stated capital as to that part represented by such shares. Id. art. 4.12. See
20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 875.
973. See, e.g., CARY 1254; Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftmanship, 42
CALIF. L. REv. 243, 255, 290 (1954); Israels, Limitations on the Corporate Purchase
of Its Own Shares, 22 Sw. L.J. 755, 756 (1968).
974. Cf. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.38(A) (1956). "Dividends among stockholders of the same class must always be pro rata, equal, and without discrimination
or preference." 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5352, at 723.
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surplus without need for shareholder approval, 975 perhaps they should be
given comparable authority with respect to repurchases. But at a minimum,
if the articles do not permit the safeguards of either class or shareholder voting, there should be the same requirement for repurchases measured by capital or reduction surplus as there is for repurchases made to the extent of
earned surplus available therefor, i.e., that accrued preferential dividends
9 76
shall have been fully paid first.
The second amendment will have even greater impact because it prohibits
a corporation not only from purchasing but also from making payment either
directly or indirectly for shares when there is reasonable ground for believing
the corporation is or would become insolvent by such purchase or payment,
or if after the purchase or payment the fair value of the total assets will be
less than the total amount of debts. 9 77 By adding the word "payment"
throughout the section, the amendment makes clear that insolvency either in
the equity or bankruptcy sense 978 will cut off any attempted distribution of
corporate assets to the selling shareholder to the detriment of creditors. This
applies even though the original commitment to purchase the shares may
have been lawful at the time it was made because the requisite surplus was
available. 9 79 In this regard, it should be noted that "payment" was not added
975. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.40(A), (B) (1956).
976. Id. art. 2.03(C).
977. Ch. 545, § 5, [1973] Tex. Laws 1488, amending Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.03(F) (1956).
978. "[I]nsolvency in the equity sense has always meant an inability of the debtor
to pay his debts as they mature. Under the Bankruptcy Act it means an insufficiency
of assets at a fair valuation to pay the debts." Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 303
(1945) (Douglas, J.). See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 618,
at 79. The question has been asked why Texas uses insolvency in both senses; while
a corporation with surplus can be insolvent in the equity sense, how can it then have
a surplus if it is insolvent in the bankruptcy sense? Hartmann & Wilson, Payment For
Repurchased Shares Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 26 Sw. L.J. 725, 731
n.20 (1972). An answer is that it cannot, but that is not the end of the matter because
even though there is no surplus, stated capital can be used for repurchases to eliminate
fractional shares, collect or compromise corporate indebtedness, pay off dissenting shareholders, or to effect the redemption or repurchase of redeemable shares. TEx. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.03(B) (1956).
Thus even though a capital deficit results from
such repurchases, the corporation still might be able to pay its debts as they become
due and hence not be insolvent in an equity sense. Use of the bankruptcy test as well
assures that the fair value of assets will not be reduced below the total amount of debts
whether immediately due or not. Cf. Kessler, supra note 948, at 666 n.93.
979. If reduction surplus is used as the basis for repurchase of shares when the corporation is insolvent, then even before the amendment directors who voted for or assented to a payment "out of" reduction surplus to repurchase shares became liable to
the corporation or a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy for the amount paid out in order
to discharge the claims of specified creditors, but only to the extent their claims were
not otherwise satisfied out of corporate assets. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.41 (A)
(6) (1956).
A director held to such liability would then be entitled to contribution
from any shareholder who received any such payment out of reduction surplus. Id. The
liability provision was inserted into the TBCA to protect creditors and prevent abuses
caused by creating reduction surplus and then using it to make distributions in partial
liquidation or to repurchase shares. Bailey, supra note 945, at 486. Arguably, even if
reduction surplus were used to justify the payment for a repurchase of shares, article
2.41(A)(6) does not apply since technically when shares are repurchased, the normal
accounting entry is to credit cash and debit treasury shares. Unless the shares acquired
are immediately cancelled, the reduction surplus account is not diminished although it
becomes restricted to the extent of the repurchase by virtue of article 2.03(E). See
Hackney, supra note 948, at 1392 n.166. But given the need for protection of creditors
when distributions of corporate assets are made to shareholders at a time of insolvency
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to the surplus requirements of sections B, C and D of article 2.03. Thus,
the test of the validity of a purchase of shares is still to be resolved initially
on the basis of both the needed capital or surplus therefor as well as for solvency, whereas the test for payment for repurchased shares is to be deter-

mined solely on the basis of solvency in both senses of the word. Put another
way, if a solvent corporation had the proper capital or surplus on hand at
the time of repurchase, payment can be made at a later time without any
surplus, provided the corporation is not then insolvent or would be made so
98 0
by payment for the shares.
The new amendment corresponds to a similar change made in the Model
Act in 1956981 and should go far both in resolving some problems with respect to the former law discussed recently at some length in this Journal9sz
and those raised by the three recent cases discussed below, particularly Williams v. Nevelow 9 8 3

Until the Williams case, the Texas courts had not ad-

dressed themselves to the issue of whether the surplus cutoff test prescribed
in the TBCA for repurchases of shares also applied when deferred or install-

ment payments were being later made and it was evident the corporation did
not -then 'have the needed surplus.9 8 4 Nor was the law elsewhere very
clear. 98 5 Prior to the adoption of modern corporation statutes embodying a
surplus or some other definable test for determining the validity of share repurchases, the courts, if recognizing the right of the corporation to repurchase
shares at all, 98 8 used a standard of "no prejudice to the rights of creditors"
in either of its two accepted forms, it is doubtful a court would be deterred from imposing liability under article 2.41(A) (6) because of a semantic difference.
980. See Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978, at 734; Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HAuv. L. REV. 303, 322 (1965).
981. Then section 5 (now section 6) of the Model Act, dealing with acquisition. and
disposition of a corporation's own shares, was revised in 1956 to include the "purchase
or payment" terminology. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1957
1 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5 (1960).

ADDENDUM

4;

982. See Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978.
983. 501 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), rev'd, 513 S.W.2d 535
(Tex. 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 1006-21 infra.
984. One federal judge had expressed himself on the matter. Palmer v. Justice, 322
F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Tex.) (Taylor, J.), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1971);
see discussion in text accompanying notes 996-1002 infra.
985. Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978, at 731; Herwitz, supra note 980, at 311.
986. Most American courts recognized the right of a corporation to repurchase its
shares even in the absence of statutory authorization which is now common, but a few
followed the English rule enunciated in Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (H.L.
1887), forbidding such purchases either under the common law or because deemed forbidden by other legislation. E.g., Latulippe v. New England Inv. Co., 77 N.H. 31, 86
A. 361, 362 (1913); Darnel-Love Lumber Co. v. Wiggs, 144 Tenn. 113, 230 S.W. 391,
393 (1921); Pace v. Pace Bros., 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1, 8 (1936). See generally BA1LL.ANTINE 604; Cary 1593; 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2824-26; 1
G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 112, 491 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as HosTEIN]; Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares,
89 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1941); Levy, Purchase by an English Company of Its Own
Shares, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1930); Nemmers, The Power of A Corporation to Purchase Its Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 161; Wormser, The Power of a Corporation
to Acquire Its Own Stock, 24 YALE L.J. 177 (1915). Although prior to adoption of
the TBCA, there was no Texas statute specifically permitting repurchase of shares,
Texas cases followed the majority American rule. E.g., Koch v. Val Verde Mercantile
Corp., 4 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1928); San Antonio Hardware
Co. v. Sanger, 151 S.W. 1104, 1105 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 19.12), error ref.;
Howe Grain & Mercantile Co. v. Jones, 51 S.W. 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899). See
generally I I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAs CORPORATIONS § 79; Blackstock, A Corporation's
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or invoked the trust fund doctrine.0 87 This evolved into an insolvency test
with much depending on whether the purchase was consummated before or
after that status had been reached. As two commentators put it, "if the repurchase preceded insolvency, the transaction was lawful, while if repurchase
followed insolvency, it was illegal." 988 Additional difficulties arose when deferred payments were involved, with the question then becoming whether insolvency was to be tested for at the time the repurchase contract was made
or when payments were due. The majority view was expressed in a Fifth
Circuit decision, Robinson v. Wangemann,98 9 an often-cited holding and as
indicated below, used as the basis for decisions of the lower courts in the
Williams case. 990 The court in Robinson rationalized that because the corporation received nothing of real value when it reacquired its shares, anything
later paid for them in cash or other assets involved a distribution to shareholders that would harm creditors if the corporation were then insolvent. As
quoted by the court of civil appeals in Williams:
In principle, the contract between [the shareholders] and the corporation was executory until the stock should be paid for in cash. It is
immaterial that the corporation was solvent and had sufficient surplus
to make payment when the agreement was entered into. It is necessary
to a recovery that the corporation should be solvent and have sufficient surplus to prevent injury to creditors when the payment is actually made. This was an implied condition in the original note and
renewals accepted by [the shareholder].9 91
The minority rule was exemplified in Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 92 a
New Jersey decision, where the court considered the choice of payment for
the stock in either cash or by an obligation payable in the future one the
corporation could legitimately make if solvent at the -time of the purchase
and not acting in disregard of the equitable rights of other shareholders. If
it elected the obligation route, the selling shareholder became a creditor who
993
would rank equally with other creditors.
The advent of modern statutes such as the Model Act adopting primarily
a combined surplus and insolvency test to determine the legitimacy of stock
repurchases failed to resolve the issue because some courts then used both
Power to Purchase Its Own Stock and Some Related Problems, 13 TaxAs L. REv. 442
(1935).
987. See Dodd, supra note 986, at 701; Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978, at 727;
Herwitz, supra note 980, at 305; Note, Stock Repurchase Abuses and the No Prejudice
Rule, 59 YALE L.J. 1177 (1950).
988. Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978, at 728.
989. 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935).
990. Williams v. Nevelow, 501 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973),
rev'd, 513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974).
991. Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1935), as quoted in
Williams v. Nevelow, 501 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), rev'd,
513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added by Williams court).
992. 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140 (Ch. 1932).
993. The holding in Wolff was seemingly repudiated in Kleinberg v. Schwartz, 87
N.J. Super. 216, 208 A.2d 803 (App. Div.), aff'd on opinion below, 46 N.J. 2, 214 A.2d
313 (1965), but was revived in a revision of the New Jersey statutes that rejected the
Kleinberg ruling and reinstated the time of purchase for application of the surplus cutoff
test. N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:7-16(6) (1969) (Commissioner's Comment 1968); see
CARY 1603.
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standards to question the validity of installment or deferred payments even
though the original purchase had been properly made. 994 But other courts
did not. Thus in Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co. 95 the Minnesota Supreme Court permitted enforcement of chattel mortgages executed to secure
a corporation's promissory note given to pay for its shares when it had adequate surplus on hand, ruling that the liens created by the mortgages were
not affected by the subsequent depletion of corporate surplus. More significantly, in Palmer v. Justice, the federal decision referred to earlier, 996 the
court considered the application of the TBCA to a similar situation when at
the time the shares in question were repurchased the corporation had ample
earned and capital surpluses to cover the transaction but not when the promissory note given in consideration was paid three years later. The court indicated by way of dictum that the term "purchase" used in article 2.03 refers
997
to the time the agreement is entered into but not when payment is made,

but found for the selling shareholders in an action brought by the corporation's trustee in bankruptcy to recover the note payment on the ground that
there was neither statutory lability under article 2.41998 nor common law lia-

bility under the trust fund doctrine. 999 It also distinguished the Robinson
case because there the obligation under attack had not yet been paid when
filed as a claim in the corporation's bankruptcy proceeding whereas in its case
the repayment had occurred almost two-and-a-half years prior to the filing
of bankruptcy by the corporation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in a curious
per curiam decision 0 0 saying that it was not necessary to consider whether
the corporation had to have sufficient unrestricted surplus at the time the actual payment was made, because the shares were repurchased to compromise
an indebtedness owed by or to the corporation as expressly authorized by ar994. See, e.g., Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737,
742 (4th Cir. 1960); In re Mathews Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 818, 821 (S.D. Cal.
1954); Cutter Labs. Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 313-14, 34 Cal. Rptr. 317,
323-24 (1963); Burk v. Cooperative Fin. Corp., 62 Wash. 2d 740, 384 P.2d 618, 625
(1963). See also Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978, at 731-32; Herwitz, supra note
980, at 311.
995. 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967).
996. See note 984 supra.
997. 322 F. Supp. at 894.
998. The court reasoned that TBCA art. 2.41(A)(6), imposing liability on the directors for payments out of reduction surplus as the purchase price of shares, did not apply
because at the time of payment there was no showing the corporation was insolvent either before or after the repurchase, as required by that provision. Nor could liability
be imposed under TBCA art. 2.41(E), giving a director against whom a claim is asserted
by that article a right of contribution from a shareholder who receives a dividend "or
other distribution of assets," since, assuming the quoted phrase included payments made
to repurchase shares, no showing was made that the shareholders who received the distribution knew its payment.was illegal, as required by the subsection. 322 F. Supp. at
895-96.
999. Application of the trust fund doctrine in Texas is dependent on two conditions:
(1) the corporation's insolvency, and (2) its cessation of doing business. See text accompanying, and authorities cited in, note 869 supra. In the court's view both of these
conditions applied to any attempt to recover illegal dividends or other distributions, as
indicated in Temple Lumber Co. v. Pineland Naval Stores Co., 25 S.W.2d 675, 677
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930), since the TBCA does not cover the matter specifically, agreeing on this point with Lebowitz, Duties and Liabilities of Directors, in TExAs
BusmNEss CORPORATION Acr INSTrFUTE PROCEEDINGS 67, 91 (1955), reprinted in 3A
TEx. Rlv. Clv. STAT. ANN. 500, 521 (1956).

1000. 451 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1971).

322 F. Supp. at 896.
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ticle 2.03(B)(2) 100 1 "and there the matter ends.' 0 0 2 Given the court's position in the judicial hierarchy, no one would quarrel that that is where the
matter stood as far as the parties were concerned. The difficulty is that the
court's pronouncement is a non sequitur because in all the cases in point the
initial purchase could equally have been said to have been authorized under
statutory solvency or stated capital or surplus standards.
It is against this background then that the reasons for the 1973 amendment must be evaluated and its impact on the recent cases discussed next
must be considered. As the Bar Committee sees it, the "amendment assures
that the insolvency limitation is applied both at the time of purchase and at
the time of payment" but does not purport to affect the surplus restriction
which applies only at the date of purchase. 1003 But despite this effort at clarification, one nagging doubt remains. Suppose the corporation gives a valid
secured promissory note in payment for its shares when adequate surplus is
available but at the time the note must be paid it has become insolvent. Arguably, any attempt to satisfy the note out of corporate assets at that time
would be an indirect payment for the shares at a time of insolvency and consequently prohibited by amended article 2.03(F). But is giving a secured
negotiable instrument "payment" for the shares so that at the time they were
purchased they were fully paid for in the sense that "value" has been given
for them? The Texas Supreme Court has dropped a tantalizing hint this may
be so1004 and for that reason has suggested that "[i]n view of the historical
judicial prohibition against enforcement of otherwise unconditional promises
of payment after the time of insolvency, it would be well for the Legislature
to settle the question expressly."' 100 5 Hopefully the Bar Committee at least
will consider the court's suggestion.
1001. The subsection cited allows a corporation by act of its board of directors to

repurchase its shares to the extent of the aggregate of any available unrestricted surplus
and its stated capital to collect or compromise any debt owed by or to the corporation.
Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03(B)(2) (1956). Insufficient facts were stated,
however, to know the nature of the debt being collected or under what other circumstances the shares in question were repurchased.
1002. 451 F.2d at 371.
1003. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.03, 3A TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 28
(Supp. 1974).
1004. In reversing the San Antonio court of civil appeal's decision in Williams v.
Nevelow, 501 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), the supreme court
noted the distinction now made between purchase and payment by the 1973 amendment,
but then added: "It does not necessarily follow that a different result would be reached
in the present case if the amended language of the statute with reference to solvency
of the corporation were applicable. The issuance of a secured negotiable instrument
could be considered 'payment' for the repurchased stock." 513 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex.
1974), citing Hartmann & Wilson, supra note 978, at 735, wherein the authors argue
that decisions (such as those of the lower courts in Williams) that hold that repurchase
contracts are executory until cash is actually paid overlook the fact that a negotiable
promissory note constitutes "payment" under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code in
that "value" is transferred to the selling shareholder by the corporation's issuance of the
note. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(44) (1968).
1005. 513 S.W.2d at .539. One legislative solution might be that used by New Jersey
in restoring application of the surplus cutoff test at the time shares are repurchased, see
note 993 supra, by providing: "A corporation which has purchased its own shares out
of surplus may defer payment for such shares over such period as may be agreed between it and the selling shareholder. The obligation so created shall constitute an ordinary debt of the corporation and the validity of any payment made upon the debt so
created shall not be affected by the absence of surplus at the time of such payment."
N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:7-16(6) (1969).
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Case Law Developments. Three recent cases dealt with the validity of corporate reacquisition of shares with the most important being Williams v.
Nevelow, 100 6 discussed in part above, primarily because of the reasons given
for its reversal by the Texas Supreme Court.
In Williams the trustee in bankruptcy of Highway Drilling Company, Inc.
brought an action to set aside a foreclosure of a security agreement between
Highway and its former sole shareholder, Williams. The agreement covered
virtually all of the equipment and personal property of Highway and had
been given to secure its note in payment for the repurchase of 1,164 of its
shares. The note and agreement were part of a larger transaction whereby
Williams' son and two others bought the remainder of his stock by giving him
their own promissory note as consideration, secured by a pledge of the shares.
Both notes were monthly installment notes except that Highway's installment
payments covered interest only and its note could not be prepaid until the
individuals' note had been paid in full; moreover, any default in payments
on their note would cause acceleration of maturity of Highway's note at Williams' option. ,In addition, Williams received all the accounts receivable but
agreed to pay all of Highway's debts other than its note to him. A year after
Williams sold out he foreclosed on the secured property after defaults in payments on the notes and his learning that Highway was on the verge of bankruptcy. He bought in the property sold for $20,000, claiming it was not
worth more although Highway's records indicated the value was much
greater. Shortly thereafter Highway voluntarily entered into bankruptcy; this
action was ultimately brought by the trustee, resulting in a judgment setting
the foreclosure sale aside, largely on the authority of the Robinson case. 100 7
On appeal to the San Antonio court of civil appeals, Williams contended
that (1) at the time of the transaction Highway had over $140,000 in unrestricted earned surplus which was more than sufficient to authorize the purchase of his shares under article 2.03, (2) all existing creditors had been
paid, (3) all creditors represented by the trustee were subsequent creditors
after he sold out, and (4) there were no pleadings or evidence of fraud. The
trustee countered that the effect of the two transactions was to tie up all of
Highway's assets which were used to secure the personal purchase of its stock
by its new owners and to help precipitate its ultimate insolvency and bankruptcy. The trustee's basic contention, however, was that the case was controlled by Robinson.
The San Antonio court agreed. As it saw it, the crucial question was
whether Highway's solvency was to be tested at the time the note and security
agreement were given or when the foreclosure was held. The answer under
the Robinson rationale was that it did not matter if creditors became such
before or after the date of the purchase; the crucial time was when payment
1006. 501 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), rev'd, 513 S.W.2d 535
(Tex. 1974).
1007. Under the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, summarized in
the court of civil appeals opinion at 501 S.W.2d 944 n.1, the trial court concluded that
because the corporation was insolvent at the time of foreclosure, a fact known to Williams, payments made pursuant to the foreclosure sale were void as to corporate creditors
and therefore the bill of sale to Williams should be set aside and all assets returned to
the trustee in bankruptcy, citing Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935).
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was to be made and the corporate assets taken out. It conceded that if Highway had bought and paid for the stock at the time of the exchange, the transaction would be valid against all creditors. "However, when actual payment
for the stock is to be made at some future time, the creditors who became
such subsequent to the agreement may complain if payment is to be made
while the corporation has no earned surplus, is insolvent, or if such payment
would render the corporation insolvent.' ' 1008 As to the TBCA, the court
quoted sections A and B of article 2.03, finding that the purchase did not
fall within any of the four authorized categories listed in section B permitting
a repurchase to the extent of unrestricted surplus and stated capital for limited purposes. 100 9 The only other provision of article 2.03 mentioned was
the pre-1973 amendment insolvency cutoff in section F which was summarized in a footnote without comment. 01 0 Quite obviously, the transaction
was not one falling within article 2.03(B); under the facts given section C
permitting repurchase to the extent of unrestricted earned surplus clearly applied. Yet inexplicably and despite its pertinency, the court did not mention
section C at all. Instead reference was made to a 1917 federal case listing
some of the considerations courts take into account in condemning or sustaining the repurchase of shares,' 0 1' most of which were inapposite in view of
the more pertinent statutory standards. It finally concluded that the trial
court properly determined the case was controlled by the Robinson rationale.
One point worth noting is the court's assumption that the surplus cutoff test
as well as the insolvency rule applies at the time of payment even though
the surplus test had been satisfied when the purchase was made. This seems
contrary to the use of "purchase" in article 2.03 before its amendment,
but
10 12
in this regard the court has respectable company, as noted earlier.
At first when Williams was appealed to the supreme court, it refused to
grant the writ of error for no reversible error, 10' 13 but after considering a motion for rehearing on the application, agreed to hear the case. After stating
the facts, the court reviewed the development of the repurchase doctrine in
relation to deferred payments or use of the corporation's promissory note, taking due note of the Robinson holding relied on by the lower courts. It read
Robinson as preventing the corporation -frommaking a valid transfer of assets
to reacquire its shares unless at the time of the transfer the solvency and the
surplus of the corporation would not be impaired. But assuming Robinson
1008. 501 S.W.2d at 947 (emphasis added).
1009. Section B permits repurchases by action of the directors to the extent of any
available unrestricted surplus and stated capital to eliminate fractional shares, collect or
compromise indebtedness owed to or by the corporation, pay dissenting shareholders, or
effect the purchase or redemption of redeemable shares. TEx. Bus. CORP. Aer ANN.
art. 2.03(B) (1956).
1010. 501 S.W.2d at 948 n.7.
1011. Sanford v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 F. 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1917). Among the considerations listed, in addition to insolvency, were whether there had been an intent to
defraud present or future creditors by the repurchase, were any such creditors thus injured and if so, was the repurchase the real cause for their not being paid. Interestingly,
the court in that case rebuffed an attempt by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover funds
paid by the corporation on promissory notes it had given to repurchase shares when it
was shown that it had been solvent at all times when payments on the notes were made.
1012. See authorities cited in note 994 supra.
1013. 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.140 (1974).
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to have been the Texas rule, the enactment of the TBCA in 1955 produced
a different rule in the court's judgment. It then set out and analyzed sections
A, C, E and F of article 2.03, emphasizing the language in section C permitting the corporation to repurchase shares to the extent of the unrestricted
earned surplus available at the time of the purchase. The court concluded,
"Thus the validity of the transaction and the authority of the corporation to
repurchase its shares are determined at the time of the purchase, and the
statute places no restrictionupon the transfer of cash or assets at a subsequent
0 14
date.",
-Inthe high court's view, Highway "purchased" its stock at the time of the
initial transaction. The term "purchase" means the voluntary transfer of
property from one person to another for valuable consideration, 0 15 which includes an unconditional exchange of a promissory note for stock.'0 16 It does
not mean the act whereby the buyer finally parts with tangible property, as
the Robinson rationale suggests. This interpretation it felt was reinforced by
section E that restricts surplus to the extent it is used to permit the repurchase
of shares, since the restriction endures only until the shares have been disposed of, and not when a promissory note for which they were acquired was
paid off. Although acknowledging some courts have re-read the common law
rule as to repurchases into statutes such as the Model Act, the court read
the TBCA to require a contrary result, citing in support the Palmer'01 7 and
Tracy'0 1 cases referred to earlier. It also noted the 1973 amendment to
section F as recognition of the difference between "payment" and "purchase."
Finally, it raised the question concerning insolvency at the time of payment
noted earlier, 10'19 saying but not deciding that a different result would not necessarily have been reached in the case before it had the amendment been
in effect, even though Highway was obviously insolvent at the time payment
was made through the foreclosure sale. But this remains to be seen. While
it is useful for the court to have raised the issue and perhaps inspire a legislative solution, it apparently did not consider the other language added by
the 1973 amendment to section F, namely that the corporation shall not pay
"directly or indirectly" for shares if insolvent or if insolvency would result.
The supreme court's opinion is clearly the preferable interpretation of article 2.03 in the deferred payment situation and further justifies the change
made by the 1973 amendment. Yet there is something disquieting about
the net result of the case for it seemingly sanctions a scheme whereby a sole
shareholder of a corporation can sell out to others by having the corporation
1014. Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added).
1015. The court cites Spur Ind. School Dist. v. W.A. Holt Co., 88 S.W.2d 1071, 1073
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935); Cobb v. Webb, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 467, 64 S.W. 792,
793 (1935), error ref.
1016. "No statute is known to use the term 'purchase' to mean the act by which the
buyer finally parts with tangible property and not to mean a consummated trade which
may be the unconditional exchange of a promissory note for stock. See [TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(32) (1968); TEx. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(G) (1969)]."
513 S.W.2d at 537-38.
1017. Palmer v. Justice, 322 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 451
F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1971); discussed in text accompanying notes 996-1002 supra.
1018. Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967);
discussed in text accompanying note 995 supra.
1019. tSee text accompanying notes 1004-05 supra.
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finance the transaction in part, retain a security interest, and then after a
year foreclose and end up with the corporation's assets, while creditors, subsequent ones, true, but undoubtedly some with whom he had dealt while he
owned the corporation, are left without any substantial recourse, simply because the corporation had a sufficient balance sheet surplus at the time of
the sale. 1020 Perhaps for this reason, the supreme court was careful to note
that the TBCA provisions in point do not purport to cover the equitable
grounds for setting 2aside
a repurchase transaction but found no bad faith in
1
1
the case before it. 0
The second case is Hall v. Hall, Weller, Hall & Jeffery, Inc.,'10 22 previously
discussed in part in relation to close corporations. The action was brought
by a shareholder and former employee of a professional accounting corporation for specific performance of a stock purchase agreement between the corporation and its shareholders. Under the terms of the agreement the corporation obligated itself to buy back the shares of a shareholder upon his death,
disqualification, incapacity, termination of employment, or voluntary retirement from accounting practice with payment to be made by a promissory note
payable over a period of years. The contract further provided that to the
degree the corporation was prevented by law from making all or any part
of the repurchase, the remaining shareholders were to purchase the same.
The trial court found that under the contract formula for determining the
price of shares, the plaintiff was entitled to be paid $246,000 for his shares;
however, it also found that the corporation only had a stated capital of
$50,000, capital surplus of $135,000, and approximately $7,000 in earned
surplus. Nevertheless, it ordered the corporation to issue plaintiff a negotiable promissory note for $246,000 to pay for his shares.
On appeal, the Houston (1st District) court of civil appeals immediately
recognized the problem the corporation faced under article 2.03 since it was
evident that at most the capital surplus and earned surplus could be used
as a measure to test the validity of the repurchase. Apparently an argument
was made that under article 2.03(B)(4) the amount in stated capital could
also be considered in that redeemable shares were being acquired, but as the
court correctly pointed out, shares are redeemable only if they have a liquidation preference, 10 23 which these shares did not. The trial court's judgment
clearly would have required the corporation to purchase its own shares in an
amount not authorized by the Act and, the court added without explanation,
would have also caused it to commit an act forbidden by section F, the provision adopting the insolvency and excess of assets over liabilities cutoffs for
1020. Cf. Fagan v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 860-77 supra. There

the court did not allow technical requirements for invoking the trust fund doctrine to
hinder the imposition of liability upon controlling shareholders in a situation where it
was obvious a creditor was being defrauded.

Perhaps the lower courts in the Williams

case instinctively felt article 2.03 should be interpreted to attain the same result.
1021.

513 S.W.2d at 538.

see, e.g., 20 R.

HAMILTON,

Regarding equitable limits on the repurchase of shares,
BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 643; 1 HORNSTEIN § 495;

TExAS

Israels, supra note 973, at 758.

1022. 497 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973); see text ac-

companying notes 580-82 supra.

1023. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 4.09(A) (1956).
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repurchases. Since the corporation was to pay for the shares by a long-term
promissory note, it is not at all certain -the mere giving of the note would
have rendered the corporation insolvent in the sense of being unable to pay
its debts as they became due in the ordinary course of business; 10 24 on the
other hand, it is likely that under the figures given the accounting treatment
of the promissory note might well have resulted in the fair value of the corporation's assets being less than the total amount of its debts as specified in
section F. 0 25 At any rate, the parties themselves had contemplated that the
corporation might be unable to comply with the repurchase obligation and
had therefore committed the remaining shareholders to purchase the stock
the corporation could not acquire. The trial court erred in not requiring them
to carry out their part of the bargain which the corporation was precluded
by law from fulfilling.
In a sense the Hall case represents the converse of the problem raised in
Williams in that at the time of purchase the corporation could not satisfy the
surplus test yet it is entirely conceivable that by the time a given installment
on the corporation's note was to be paid, it had become solvent and would
have an excess of assets over liabilities even after paying the installment. 0 26
Of course, if, as indicated by the facts, the corporation could not meet section
F's assets standard when the promisory note was to be given and, as suggested
by the supreme court in Williams,10 2 7 the issuance of the note would have
constituted payment for the shares, the transaction would have definitely
been barred under the 1973 amendment to section F as well.
The third decision is a Fifth Circuit case, Witter v. Triumph Smokes,
Inc.,'10 2 8 involving facts virtually identical to those in Triumph Smokes, Inc.
v. Sarlo,10 29 a Tyler court of civil appeals decision commented on in some
detail in the 1973 Survey. 0 30 Essentially the issue raised in both cases concerned the validity of debentures that had been given in exchange for the
corporation's shares when the corporation had no earned surplus at the time
the exchange was made or later when the debentures matured and were presented for payment. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning is quite similar to that
found in the Tyler court's opinion (to which it does not refer)10 3 ' and mainly
1024. Id. art. 1.02(A)(16).
1025. Id. art. 2.03(F) (Supp. 1974).

Presumably the note would have been credited

as a note payable of $246,000 and the treasury shares account debited by the same
amount, assuming a cost method of accounting were employed. But since treasury
shares are not considered as an asset, but generally a deduction from the capital ac-

counts, it is likely the added liability of $246,000 plus other liabilities would have exceeded the fair value of the corporation's assets when the note was given. On the legal
aspects of accounting for treasury shares transactions, see, e.g., G. HILLS, THE LAW OF
ACCOUNTING 41 (1954); K. SOLOMON, LAWYER'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING THEORY
AND PRACTICE 168 (1971); Hackney, supra note 948, at 1392; Katz, Accounting Problems in CorporateDistributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 764, 779 (1941); Rudolph, Accounting for Treasury Shares Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 73 HARv. L. REV.
323 (1959); Sprouse, Accounting for Treasury Stock Transactions: Prevailing Practices and New Statutory Provisions, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 882 (1959).
1026. Thus satisfying TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03(F) (Supp. 1974).
1027. Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1974).
1028. 464 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
1029. 482 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
1030. See Lebowitz, supra note 952, at 108.
1031. The Fifth Circuit's decision was reported two months after the Tyler court's;

hence it is quite possible neither's opinion was available to the other.
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regards the issuance of the debentures under the circumstances as equivalent
to an ultra vires act and not an illegal one, even if in violation of article 2.03.
The provisions of that article were designed to protect creditors and since
there was no allegation that corporate creditors would be adversely affected
by paying the debentures and no creditor had sought to intervene, the corporation as in other situations involving limitations on the exercise of corporate
On that basis the opinion cerpower' 03 2 was estopped to deny their3 validity.
0 3
authority.1
Texas
with
squares
tainly
The issuance of debentures for shares when the corporation is not authorized to reacquire them has raised several interesting questions.10 3 4 Another
may now be asked in light of the amendment of article 2.03(F). Suppose
at the time the debentures were issued the corporation had sufficient earned
surplus on hand to justify their exchange for its shares but at the time the
debentures matured, the provisions of section F could not be satisfied because
the corporation had become bankrupt or had been placed in receivership for
insolvency. 1035 The question of course is fundamentally the same as that
posed by the Williams case, except that article 2.03(F) as amended would
seem definitely to preclude the debentures from being paid or would certainly
require subordination of their payment to claims of other creditors. 0 30 In
addition, both the Fifth Circuit and the Tyler court indicated that if creditors
rights were involved, the outcome would be different.' 037 But both opinions
also suggest that even if insolvent, the corporation would still be estopped
to prevent their payment if no creditor had complained even under the
changed language in section F.
VII.

A.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Additional Statutory Changes

Dissolution. The only changes made in the statutes dealing with voluntary
dissolution were elimination of the two-year period within which incorporators
could dissolve a corporation that had not commenced business after its certificate of incorporation had been issued10 38 and to give the directors as well
1032. E.g., Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965) (statutory
prohibition of loans to directors and officers only a limit on corporate powers and does
not make loan to president illegal). See generally 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAs BusINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 361.
1033. E.g., Triumph Smokes v. Sarlo, 482 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972),
error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 952, at 108; Lanpar Co. v. Stull, 405
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966), discussed in Pelletier, Corporations,Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134, 152 (1967).
1034. See Lebowitz, supra note 952, at 110.
1035. Cf. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.02(A) (2) (Supp. 1974).
1036. E.g., McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 367 (9th Cir. 1968); In
re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir. 1964); In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212
F. 357, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S. 760 (1914); In re Belmetals Mfg. Co.,
299 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1969); In re Dawson Bros. Constr. Co., 218 F.
Supp. 411, 413 (N.D.N.Y. 1963); cf. La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369
P.2d 45 (1962).
See generally 7 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 934, § 148.05(2); 1 HoRNSTEN § 496, at 622; Blackstock, supra note 986, at 447.
1037. Witter v. Triumph Smokes, Inc., 464 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1972); Triumph Smokes, Inc. v. Sarlo, 482 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error
ref. n.r.e.
1038. Ch. 545, § 38, [1973] Tex. Laws 1509, amending TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACr ANN.

TEXAS CORPORATION LAW

1974]

as the incorporators the power to initiate the dissolution. 10 3 9 The latter
proviso is consistent with the pattern of other of the 1973 amendments which
expand the powers of the first board of directors and correspondingly minimize the role of the incorporators. 10 40 Another, more general, amendment

that will have more impact is the authorization now given to include a provision in the articles of incorporation that allows dissolution or certain other
corporate actions requiring shareholder approval to be approved by a vote
of the holders of less than two-thirds of the shares outstanding or of each
class of shares entitled to vote thereon if a majority or more. 104 ' As to involuntary dissolution, note should again be taken of the amendment added to
article 7.01 as part of the Penal Code revision. The attorney general is now
authorized to bring an action for involuntary dissolution when a corporation
or a 'high managerial agent in the conduct of its ;affairs has been convicted
of a felony if it can be proven that either has engaged in a persistent course
of felonious conduct and dissolution is required to prevent future felonious
1 0 42
conduct of the same character.
Foreign Corporations. There have been both statutory and case law developments relating to foreign corporations which are worthy of mention. Nearly
all of the cases dealt with issues of jurisdiction or venue and since those of
importance have been commented on by others as part of the annual survey,10 43 they will not be treated here.
art. 6.01 (Supp. 1974). In the opinion of the Bar Committee the two-year limitation
was unnecessary as it seemed to serve no useful function. Comment of Bar Committee
to Art. 6.01, 3A TEx. REV. CIV.

STAT. ANN.

148 (Supp. 1974).

Another impetus for

the change was the deletion of the two-year period from section 82 of the Model Act
which, as section 75 of the Act's 1953 revision, served as the source for article 6.01.
ABA

MODEL

BUS.

CORP.

AcT ANN. 2d, § 82, Comment (1960).

1039. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 6.01 (Supp. 1974). Since the first board of
directors is named in the articles of incorporation, id. art. 3.02(A)(12), it of course can
function prior to the commencement of business, see, e.g., id. art. 3.06. However, in
giving the directors as well as the incorporators the power to dissolve, not all the provisions of article 6.01 were conformed to reflect the change. Thus, subsection (1)(g)
calls for a recitation in the articles of dissolution that "a majority of the incorporators
elect that the corporation be dissolved," which suggests that if they are persons other
than the directors, they must consent to the dissolution, certainly a result not intended.
Similarly, subsection (3) states that the secretary of state is to deliver the certificate
of dissolution and duplicate original of the articles of dissolution to "the incorporators
or their representatives." The Bar Committee intends to seek correction of these obvious oversights as part of its 1975 legislative proposals.
1040. See discussion in text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
1041. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 9.09 (1956); see discussion in text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
1042. Ch. 399, § 2(K), [1973] Tex. Laws 989, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.
arts. 7.01(F), (G) (Supp. 1974), effective January 1, 1974. Comparable provisions
were added to TBCA article 8.16 to permit revocation of a foreign corporation's certificate of authority on the same grounds. Ch. 399, § 2(L), [1973] Tex. Laws 989, adding
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 8.16(F), (G) (Supp. 1974). See discussion in text
accompanying notes 172-75 supra. See generally Bubany, The Texas Penal Code of
1974, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 292, 309 (1974).

1043. E.g., Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex.

1973), discussed in Baade, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J.

166, 174 (1974) [cited hereinafter in this note as Baade], and in Figari, Texas Civil

Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 249 (1974); Tabulating Sys-

tems & Serv., Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1973), discussed in Baade at 170; Dorsid Trading Co. v. Du-Wald Steel Co.,
492 S.W.2d 379 (Texas Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), discussed in Baade at
169; PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 492 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Baade at 178; Humble Oil &
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Duration of Certificate of Authority. Until eliminated by one of the 1973
amendments, 10 44 a foreign corporation that had been granted a certificate of
authority to transact business in Texas had to renew its certificate every ten
years. Texas seems to have been alone among the states in limiting a foreign
corporation's admission to a specific term. 10 45 The limitation on duration reflected a policy of long standing'0 46 and was carried forward into the TBCA
when originally enacted, probably to make its adoption more palatable politically. But in light of the grant of perpetual existence to domestic corporations 0 47 and the more receptive and sympathetic policy towards qualified
foreign corporations, enabling them to enjoy the same rights and privileges
as domestic corporations, 10 48 the modification was long overdue.
Change of Name. Another amendment adds a new article to the Act that
replaces one repealed in 1967.1049 Taken verbatim from the Model Act, 1°0'1
the amendment applies to the situation that occurs whenever a qualified foreign corporation changes its name to one that would not have been granted
when the application was made, primarily because it is the same as or is deceptively similar to the name of a domestic or another qualified foreign corporation or that has been reserved or registered. 10 5' Under the amendment,
the certificate of authority of the foreign corporation will be suspended until
it has changed to a name available to it under Texas law or has otherwise
complied with the Act.10 5 2 Although a qualified foreign corporation that has
changed its name is required to procure an amendment of its certificate of
authority,' 0 53 the only sanction previously -attached for noncompliance was
revocation of its authority to do business in Texas by order of the secretary
of state for failing to file its change of name within thirty days or because
the newly adopted name is one not available for use in Texas.' 0 54 There
are several alternatives a foreign corporation whose new name cannot be used
Ref. Co. v. Preston, 487 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error dismissed, cert. granted sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Preston, 94 S. Ct. 538, 38 L. Ed. 2d 328
(1973) (No. 73-232), judgment vacated, 94 S. Ct. 1394, 39 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1974) (suggestion of mootness), discussed in Baade at 225.
1044. Ch. 545, § 42, [1973] Tex. Laws 1510, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 8.07 (Supp. 1974).
1045. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, §§ 110-12,
3.02, .03 (1960).
1046. the ten-year limitation on a foreign corporation's permit to do business in
Texas was first enacted in 1889. Ch. 78, § 6, [1889] Tex. Laws 88, 9 H. GAMMEL,
LAws OF TExAs 1115-16 (1898). At the time the TBCA was adopted in 1955, it was
part of TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1529 (1945), repealed by ch. 229, § 1, [1961]
Tex. Laws 461.
1047. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(1) (1956).
1048. Id.art. 8.02.
1049. As enacted in 1955, article 8.04 required a qualified foreign corporation that
had determined to change its name to apply to the secretary of state 120 days before
the change was to take place for a reservation of the name for use in Texas. This, however, conflicted with article 2.06(A)(4) which makes the reservation of the new name
before a change is consummated permissive. To resolve the conflict, article 8.04 was
repealed in 1967 as one of the Bar Committee's revision proposals. Ch. 657, § 20,
[1967] Tex. Laws 1729; see Amsler, Proposed Amendments Texas Business Corporation
Act, 29 TEx. B.J. 1013, 1014 (1966).
1050. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 109 (1960).
1051. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.03 (A) (2) (Supp. 1974).
1052. Ch. 545, § 39, [1973] Tex. Laws 1509, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. AT ANN.
art. 8.04 (Supp. 1974).
1053. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.13(A) (1956).
1054. Id.art. 8.16(B)(4) (Supp. 1974).
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per se can follow. If the name is deceptively similar, it may, for example,
obtain the consent of the person or corporation having the name deemed similar 10 5 5 or else file an assumed name certificate °5 6 and conduct business in
Texas under a fictitious name. 105 7 If despite these alternatives, the foreign
corporation persists in using its changed name impermissibly, it deserves to
have its authority to do business in Texas suspended.
Service of Process. Until 1973, Texas had six statutes that dealt generally
with some form of direct or constructive service of process on foreign corporations. Two could be found in the TBCA and Texas Non-Profit Corporation
Act respectively and permitted service on the president, all vice-presidents,
and the registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in Texas or if service could not be had on the registered agent, then
on the secretary of state. 0 58 The other four were part of the general civil
statutes. Articles 2031 and 2031-11059 allowed service on the president, vicepresident, secretary, treasurer, general manager, or any local or traveling
agent or traveling salesman.10 60 Article 2031 a prohibited the transaction of
business in Texas without filing a power of attorney designating a service
agent; permitted constructive service on the secretary of state if the agent
could not be found or was not appointed or maintained; and penalized a failure to designate or maintain such service agent by (1) voiding all acts done
within the state, (2) precluding the maintenance of any suit, and (3) assessing a fine of $200 for each month in violation.' 06 ' Finally, article 2031b,
the Texas "long-arm" statute, in general made the secretary of state the agent
for service of process for foreign corporations or other nonresident entities
or individuals who are required to designate a service agent but do not, or
when the latter cannot be found, or who have transacted "business" in Texas.
"Business" is defined to include entering into a contract by mail or otherwise
with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part here or the
1055. Id. art. 8.03(A)(2).
1056. Id. art. 2.05(B) (1956); id. art. 8.03(A)(2) (Supp. 1974). Under the latter
provision, if the foreign corporation's name is not legally available the corporation may
still obtain a certificate of authority to do business in Texas if it files an assumed name
certificate with the secretary of state and county clerk as provided in TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art..5924.1 (Supp. 1974), but business can only be transacted in Texas under
the assumed name. Interestingly, the Texas assumed name law states specifically it does
not apply to either domestic or qualified foreign corporations, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 5927 (1962), 5927a (Supp. 1974), but presumably the TBCA provisions as
a later enactment will prevail.
1057. See generally 19, 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 69,
975-76; H. KENDRICK & J. KENDRICK, TEXAS TRANSACTION GUIDE § 29.23 (1972); Pelletier, IncorporationPlanning in Texas, in INCORPORATION PLANNING IN TEXAS 5 (G. Pelletier ed. 1973).
1058. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr

ANN.

art. 8.10 (1956); TEX. REV. Crv.

STAT.

ANN. art.

1396-8.09 (1962).
1059. Art. 2031-1 was enacted in 1935 as part of a bill that amended article 2031
to be certain that it applied to any suit then pending or thereafter brought in Texas
against a foreign corporation or other entity and to remove a restriction on service on
local or travelling salesmen limiting such service to actions arising within the state. It
provided that nothing in article 2031 as amended was to be construed to repeal any other
law dealing with service of process on foreign corporations but rather was to be regarded
as cumulative of such legislation. Ch. 431, §§ 1-2, [1935] Tex. Laws 2d Called Session
1688.
1060. Ch. 431, § 1, [1935] Tex. Laws 1688.
1061. Ch. 376, § 1, [19431 Tex. Laws 674.
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commission of any tort in whole or in part in Texas.10 6 2 Moreover, even
if the foreign corporation or nonresident was not required to designate or
maintain a service agent but nevertheless transacted business in Texas, service could also be had on the person in charge of such business if the action
10 3
arose therefrom.
Needless to say, the existence of numerous, somewhat overlapping statutes
on the same subject left considerable doubt as to their interrelationship and
the extent of their application to foreign corporations, particularly in regard
to the harsh sanctions imposed by article 203 la. 10 4 Some clarification, however, came from the courts. For example, the TBCA and Non-Profit Corporation Act provisions are limited by their terms to corporations that have been
authorized to transact business in Texas. 10 6 5 Although neither act expressly
states the mode of service it prescribes is exclusive, the Non-Profit Act does
exclude article 2031a from its application, 10 6 6 and the TBCA has been held
to prescribe the only method for obtaining service on a qualified foreign cor-

poration, preempting articles 2031 and 2031a. 1'
holding with regard to article 2031b.

7

There has been no such

However, the latter statute does not

seem to conflict with either act since all three laws provide for constructive
service on the secretary of state alone if service cannot be had on the regis-

tered agent of a qualified foreign corporation. As to non-qualified foreign
corporations, presumably the more general service statutes applied, although
commentators' 06 8 and at least one decision' 0 6 9 suggested that if such corporations transacted business in Texas when qualification was required, they
should be subject to the sanctions against bringing suit spelled out in TBCA
article 8.181070 rather than the more onerous penalties prescribed in article
1062. Ch. 43, §§ 1-7, [1959] Tex. Laws 85.

In general on the Texas long-arm

statute, see 2 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 9.29.5, 9.29.6 (rev. repl. 1970);
Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, the Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction
Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 279, 297-310 (1964); Comment, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
Under Article 2031b, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 214 (1960).
1063. Ch. 43, § 2, [1959] Tex. Laws 85.
1064. See, e.g., Shepherd, Foreign Corporations Doing Business in Texas, in TEXAS
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 35, 47 (1955), reprinted in 3A
TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. 473, 484 (1956); Garwood, Some Effects of a Foreign Corporation Qualifying or Failing To Qualify To Do Business in Texas, 26 TEX. B.J. 845,
848 (1963).
1065. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (1956); Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1396-8.09 (1962).
1066. TEX. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-8.09(D) (1962).
1067. Investors Diversified Serv., Inc. v. Bruner, 366 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1963), error ref. n.r.e.; cf. Texaco, Inc. v. McEwen, 356 S.W.2d 809,
813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962), error ref. n.r.e. (dictum); Shepherd, supra note
1064, at 49, reprinted in 3A TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. at 473, 485; Garwood, supra
note 1064, at 851.
1068. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 987, at 482; Shepherd,
supra note 1064, reprinted in 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. at 851.
1069. See State v. Cook United, Ire., 463 S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), modified on other grounds, 469 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1971).
1070. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (1956). While the article prohibits the
maintenance of a suit by a foreign corporation that has transacted business in Texas
necessitating qualification but without obtaining a certificate of authority, the corporation may defend any action brought against it in the courts of Texas; moreover, failure
to obtain the certificate will not impair the validity of any contract or act done within
the state. On the other hand, the non-qualified corporation may become liable to the
state for the franchise taxes and fees it should have paid and for additional penalties
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2031a. On the other hand, articles 2031 and 2031a have been held to govern service of process on foreign insurance companies because the TBCA
0 71
generally does not apply to such entities.'
The impetus to do something about this less than satisfactory state of the
law came when the Bar Committee considered amending TBCA article 8.10
to add a proviso taken from the Model Act' 0 72 that nothing contained in the
article "shall limit or affect the right to serve any process, notice, or demand
required or permitted by law to be served upon a foreign corporation in any
other manner now or hereafter permitted by law.' 073 The Bar Committee
was concerned that if passed, the amendment might be construed to have
reinstated applicability of articles 2031 and 2031a even to qualified foreign
corporations despite the earlier case holdings to the contrary. Thus service
might again be permissible on general managers, travelling salesmen, or local
agents under article 2031. More seriously, the sanctions imposed by article
2031 a, especially in purporting to void all acts performed by a foreign corporation prior to compliance, could well be restored to full vigor despite their
incompatibility with the more permissive philosophy of the Act. Moreover,
both statutes had been enacted in an earlier era before the Supreme Court
had expanded the dimensions of judicial jurisdiction, 0 7 4 whereas article
of $100-$5,000 for each month it has operated in the state without a certificate. See
generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 987-88.
1071. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Watson, 436 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1968), error ref. n.r.e. The court held that because TBCA art. 9.14(A) excludes
insurance companies from the TBCA's application, the TBCA's service of process provisions could not be employed for insurance companies operating under Texas laws. However, the same section provides that if the special statutes governing excluded corporations do not deal with the matters prescribed by the TBCA, the latter then supplements
the special statutes to the extent not inconsistent with them. In addition, TMCLA art.
1.03 makes the TBCA applicable to any corporation for profit to the extent not inconsistent with a special statute for a particular kind of corporation. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-1.03(A)(1)
(1962). The Texas Insurance Code in turn states that the
general corporation law applies to insurance companies the Code governs unless inconsistent with its provisions. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 2.18 (1963). It is not clear why
the specific service of process provisions of the Insurance Code did not apply, see, e.g.,
TEx. INs. CODE ANN. arts. 1.14-1, § 4 (Supp. 1974), 3.65 (1963), but assuming they
did not, the three statutes first cited would appear to make TBCA article 8.10 applicable, rather than the older statutes relied on by the court, since it was alleged the defendant insurance company had a permit from the secretary of state to conduct business in
Texas.
1072. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 116, last paragraph.
1073. Id. The Model Act provision reflects the prevailing view that where a statute
provides for service on a specified agent but does not indicate such mode of service is
exclusive, it is regarded as cumulative of other service statutes. The paragraph was included "to prevent any uncertainty in this regard." Id., Comment.
1074. Article 2031 can be traced back to an 1885 enactment, ch. 83, § 1, 2,
[1885] Tex. Laws 79, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 699 (1898). Article 2031a became
law in 1933. Ch. 202, §§ 1-5, [1933) Tex. Laws 606. The modern landmark case is
International Shoe CO. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), that adopted essentially a
minimum contacts test so long as traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
are not offended. This expanded concept of judicial jurisdiction reached a highwater
mark in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), but receded somewhat in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), in which the Court emphasized the
importance of some nexus with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the nonresident reasonable. See generally, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33 (1962); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 97 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN]; F. JAMES,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.8 (1965); G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 9394 (3d ed. 1963); R. WiNTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF Lkws 86-92
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203 lb was a modern statute that had been drafted in light of those developments. 10 75 As a consequence, the Bar Committee determined that if the
Model Act proviso was to be added as section D to article 8.10, as it was,
articles 2031, 2031-1, and 2031a should be repealed. The proposed amend-

ment and repealer were placed in a separate bill and ultimately passed by
the legislature in that form. 10 7 6 The result is that there are now but three
statutes on service of process that apply to general business or non-profit foreign corporations: TBCA article 8.10 and Non-Profit Corporation Act article
8.09 for qualified foreign corporations, and article 2031b, the long-arm statute, for use against either foreign corporations that should have qualified to
transact business and should have designated a registered agent but have not
or those whose activities within the state do not require qualification 1077 but
have nevertheless transacted some business in Texas.
Despite the needed house cleaning, one problem remains.

Article 2031b

as presently enacted appears to limit jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
not required to qualify or that does not have a regular place of business or
service agent in the state to actions arising out of the transaction of business
in Texas.

This may represent a considered judgment by Texas that it does

not desire to expand its judicial jurisdiction to its utmost constitutional bounds
even though sufficient activities are conducted to constitute a generally affiliating basis therefor. 0 Ts
(1971); 4 C.
(1969).

WRIGHT

& A.

On the other hand, since the repealed statutes conMILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§§ 1067-68

1075. The Texas long-arm statute is derived substantially in form and content from
a nonresident service statute proposed by Professor John R. Wilson of Baylor University. Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: An Invitation and a Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363, 378-79 (1957). See also Thode, supra note 1062, at 30310; Thode, "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction and Special Appearance-A Reply, 28 TEx. B.J.
271, 272 (1965); Wilson, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 22 TEx. B.J. 221, 222
(1959); Comment, supra note 1062. The federal courts have interpreted article 2031b
as extending as far as due process will permit. See, e.g., Jetco Electronic Indus., Inc.
v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed in Baade, supra note 1043,
at 171; Gurley v. Lindsley, 459 F.2d 268, 278 (5th Cir. 1972); Atwood Hatcheries v.
Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 3.57 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1966); Reul v. Sahara Hotel,
372 F. Supp. 995, 997 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Silver
& Mining Corp., 358 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1973), discussed in Baade, supra
note 1043, at 169; Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. M/S Galini, 323 F. Supp. 79, 81
(S.D. Tex. 1971). The Texas courts, however, have taken a somewhat more restrictive
view and have required that jurisdiction be based on some purposeful act or transaction
consummated in the state and that the cause of action arise from or be connected with
such act or transaction. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Lanpar, 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966);
Tabulating Systems & Serv., Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Corpus Christi 1973), discussed in Baade, supra note 1043, at 170; Sun-X Int'l Co.
v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967), error ref. n.r.e. But
see Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref.
n.r.e., discussed in Baade, supra note 1043, at 225. See generally 20 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 973; 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 1062, §§ 9.29.5,
9.29.6; Comment, How Minimum is Minimum Contact? An Examination of "Long
Arm" Jurisdiction,9 S.TEx. L.J. 184 (1967).
1076. Ch. 63, §§ 1, 2, [1973] Tex. Laws 124-25, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 8.10(D) (Supp. 1974), repealing TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2031, 2031-1,
2031a (1964).
1077. See TEx. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.01(B) (Supp. 1974).
1078. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognizes a state's power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business within the state with respect
to claims not arising from such business if the business carried on is "so continuous and
substantial as to make it reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdiction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 47(2) (1971); see Perkins v. Benguet
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tained no such limitation' 07 9 nor is it found in the TBCA or Non-Profit Act
articles, the resulting hiatus in empowering Texas courts to entertain actions
involving non-qualified foreign corporations arising out of their activities elsewhere' 080 may have been more a matter of legislative oversight than deliberate policy making. If so, consideration should be given to corrective legislation.

B.

Other Decisions

Disregard of the Corporate Entity. The number of cases in which efforts
were made to go behind the corporate entity to batter down the buffer of
limited liability were not as many as in previous years. Some, involving invocation of the alter ego doctrine to hold managing shareholders personally
responsible for corporate transactions, have already been commented
upon. 10 81 A few decisions dealing with the parent-subsidiary relationship
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-49 (1952). See generally A. EHRFNZWEIG, supra note 1074, at 114; F. JAMES, supra note 1074, at 640; G. STuMBERG, supra note
1074, at 95; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1074, at 107; C. WRIr & A. MILLER, supra
note 1074, § 1069, at 261; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1141 (1966).
1079. Indeed art. 2031 was amended in 1935 to remove a phrase that limited service
on a local or travelling agent or travelling salesman to actions arising within the state.
See note 1059 supra. Moreover, service on a local agent of a foreign corporation under
the statute and its predecessors has been held sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over a transitory action arising outside the state. E.g., Buie v. Chicago, R.I. &
P. Ry, 9.5 Tex. 51, 67, 65 S.W. 27, 32 (1901); El Paso & Sw. Co. v. Chisolm, 180 S.W.
156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1915), error dismissed; Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Shaw, 77 S.W. 433, 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903), error ref.; see 2 R. McDONALD, sup'a
note 1062, § 9.25; Comment, Service of Process on Foreign Corporationsin Texas, 20
TEXAs L. REV. 91, 93 (1941). On the other hand, although nothing in art. 2031a suggested its scope was confined to service with respect to actions arising from the foreign
corporation's activities within the state, see Comment, supra, at 95, it was nevertheless
held the article could not be employed to exercise jurisdiction with respect to transitory
actions occurring in other states and unconnected with business done in Texas. Knobloch v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 154 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1946); Stephens v. Richman &
Samuels, Inc., 118 F.2d 1011, 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 651 (1941); see
Insurance Co. of North America v. Lone Star Package Car Co., 107 F. Supp. 645, 651
(S.D. Tex. 1952); cf. Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 409 (1929);
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 130 (1915); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22 (1907). See also 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 1062, § 9.26.4;
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 1074, § 1067, at 227; Comment, supra, at 95.
1080. Nevertheless, given the penchant of the federal courts to regard article 2031b
as co-extensive with the due process clause, it is not inconceivable, despite the limiting
language of that statute, that if a non-qualified foreign corporation is regarded as having
a sufficient continuum of business in Texas either directly or through a wholly owned
subsidiary, jurisdiction may yet be asserted as to an out-of-state claim. One recent federal district court has come very close to so holding. See Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372
F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974), where in a products liability action arising from the explosion of a chlorine tank near a swimming pool in Nevada, jurisdiction was upheld
against a California corporation which was a wholly integrated subsidiary of a New
York parent corporation qualified to do business in Texas on the ground that the activities performed in Texas by the New York parent were the same as the activities performed in Nevada by the California defendant "and in that sense, the cause of action
is connected with the parent's activities in Texas." Id. at 1002. Cf. Bland v. Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1971), discussed in Lebowitz,
supra note 952, at 89. But cf. Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama Ltd., 353 F.2d 954,
956 (5th Cir. 1965); Odom v. Thomas, 338 F. Supp. 877, 879 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Hayes
v. Caltex Petroleum Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1205, 1206 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also Baade,
supra note 1043, at 168-73.
1081. Pravel, Wilson & Matthews v. Voss, 471 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1973); Simon
v. Estate of W.P. Allen, 497 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e.;
Fagan v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
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and raising issues concerning judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other conflict of laws problems have been expertly discussed by Professor
Hans Baade.10 82 Two cases remain that should be noted and both illustrate
the enterprise theory advanced some years ago by Professor Berle. Under
this theory the courts in recognition of economic reality will sometimes con-

struct a single enterprise from a number of incorporated parts in order to prevent fraud or an inequity or an evasion of statutory or other public policy.108 3
In Allright Texas, Inc. v. Simons'08 4 the plaintiff successfully sued Allright

Texas, Inc. and Allright Garage, Inc. to recover losses resulting from the negligence of the defendants' employees in failing to guard against the theft of
his car and its contents. The plaintiff had parked his car on a lot operated
by Allright Garage but was given a ticket used by the Allright Texas parking lot across the street. On appeal, the defendants argued it was error to
enter judgment against both corporations. The evidence showed there were
five Allright corporations that had interlocking relationships in the operation
of parking lots. One of the five entities handled all the bookkeeping and
it or one other Allright company paid all the employees of the five. This,
the court ruled, was sufficient to support a finding that the two defendants
had been doing business under the same trade name and justified the trial
court's looking beyond the corporate form and determining as a matter of
law that the relationship in reality between the corporations constituted a
single business enterprise. 08 5
The second case, Clark's-Gamble,Inc. v. State, 0 8 6 was another in a series
involving the same multicorporation discount chain and its efforts to avoid
the effects of the Texas law forbidding sales of particular merchandise 08on8
0 87 As in most of the other cases,'
consecutive Saturdays and Sundays.
[14th Dist.] 1973); see discussion in text accompanying notes 875-86 supra; cf. Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (president
of corporation held. not subject to jurisdiction of Texas courts although corporation
would have been; no effort by plaintiff to seek jurisdiction by piercing corporate veil
or holding president as alter ego of corporation), discussed in Baade, supra note 1043,
at 225.
1082. Dailey v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed
in Baade, supra note 1043, at 203, 226; San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 364 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed in Baade, supra note 1043, at 173; Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364
F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973), discussed in Baade, supra note 1043, at 174.
1083. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947).
See also 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 234, at 227; E. LAITY,
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 212-20 (1936).

1084. 501 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
1085. Accord, Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Miskell, 424 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1968), error ref. n.r.e.; Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645,
656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962); State v. Lone Star Gas Co., 86 S.W.2d 484, 491
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 304 U.S. 224 (1938); see Murphy Bros. Chevrolet Co. v. East Oakland Auto Action, 437 S.W.2d 272, 276 (Tex. Civ.
App.-E1 Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e.; Continental Supply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore
Co., 55 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932), error dismissed. See also
Lebowitz, Corporations,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 86, 147 (1972).

1086. 486 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
1087. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Supp. 1974), formerly TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 286a (Supp. 1974), transferred by authority of ch. 399, § 5, [1973] Tex.
Laws 995.

1088. State v. Cook United, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1971), modifying 463
S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971); State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d
105 (Tex. 1971), rev'g 455 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970); Clark's
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one corporation (Clark's) operated the discount store six days a week but
on Saturday night leased the premises and sold the inventory to another corporation, appropriately named Sundaco, Inc., that operated the store on Sunday and then at midnight returned premises and unsold inventory back to
Clark's. The state brought an action against both to enjoin their violation
of the law by operating a retail store seven days a week. The trial court
found that Sundaco operated the store on Sunday as the -agent or conduit of
Clark's, and granted a permanent injunction. On appeal, the Amarillo court
of civil appeals reviewed the evidence that showed among other facts that
both corporations kept the same hours of operations, signs and price tags remained the same, Sundaco kept its records in the discount store's office, the
employees of both had the same pay scales, and money would be loaned to
Sundaco from the other's money room to start the Sunday operation. The
primary factual distinction between this and the earlier cases was that no employee of either corporation would work for the other on Saturday and Sunday
and that there was little overlap between the officers and board of the two
corporations, although the president of Sundaco who owned a third of its
shares when incorporated was an officer in other corporations affiliated with
Clark's. Nevertheless the Amarillo court had no difficulty in upholding the
trial court's order on the ground that despite the differences in operation,
there could be no doubt the general operation and overall manner of conducting the business was substantially the same as in the other Sundaco cases.
Thus, given the admitted purpose for the creation of Sundaco and the close
alliance between the companies, including the absence of any arms' length
transactions between them, the Sundaco arrangement violated the statute.
Usury. In 1967 the Texas Legislature, pursuant to a constitutional amendment adopted in 1960 that authorized the legislature to classify loans and
lenders and define and fix the maximum rates of interest, 10 8 9 passed a statute
as part of the TMCLA permitting a corporation to agree to pay up to oneand-one-half percent interest per month on any funds it borrowed so long
as the principal amount of the obligation was $5,000 or more. 10 90 The statute further provides: "and in such instances, the claim or defense of usury
by such corporation, its successors, guarantors, assigns or anyone on its behalf
is prohibited" except as to charitable or religious corporations. 1091 The emphasized phrase, or rather its omission in a recent decision, has led to some
Texas, Inc. v. Stewart, 466 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error ref. n.r.e.,

discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 1085, at 149; State v. Cook United, Inc., 463 S.W.2d
509 (Tex. civ. App.-Fort Worth), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 469 S.W.2d

709 (Tex. 1971), discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 1085, at 165; Sundaco, Inc. v. State,
463 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), error ref. n.r.e, discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 1085, at 149; Suttle v. State, 457 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1970); State v. Sundaco, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969), error
ref. n.r.e., appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 591 (1970).

1089. Tiax. CONsT. art. XVI, § 11, as amended Nov. 8, 1960.
1090. Ch. 296, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 713, adding TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974) (Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act), discussed in
Amsler, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 59, 68 (1968); Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TExAs L. REv. 419, 438-41
(1971); Comment, Lender Participation in Borrower's Venture: A Scheme to Receive
Usurious Interest, 8 HOUSTON L. REy. 546, 555, 568-69 (1971).
1091. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
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confusion, at least by a headnote writer, as to whether a corporate undertaking to pay interest in excess of the permitted one-and-one-half percent per
month can be claimed as usurious by a corporation.
The case is Sud v. Morris'0 9 2 and concerned the sustaining of a plea of
abatement in an action brought by Sud to recover double the usurious interest
of fifteen percent that he had paid on a promissory note for $500,000 which
he and MPS Production Company had jointly and severally executed. The
ground of the plea was that MPS and several other parties named in a letter
agreement were necessary parties. The status of MPS was not shown, but
assuming it were a corporation, the Beaumont court of civil appeals ruled
the effect of TMCLA provision was to deprive it of any cause of action it
may have had for usury; for that reason it was not a necessary or indispensable party to the litigation. The court quoted the statement in the statute but
failed to include 'the emphasized phrase "and in such instances." Presumably
it was this omission that led the South Western Reporter headnote writer to
state flatly that "a corporation has no cause of action for usury.' 10 98 The
accuracy of this statement of law would be questionable in any case, since
the court at one point stated that if MPS were a corporation, the fifteen percent rate the plaintiff alleged he was required to pay and did pay was legal
as to it; 10 9 4 hence the court may have been doing no more than ruling that
for that reason the corporation had no cause of action for the recovery of
usurious interest. But if so, doubt would still remain as to the correctness
of such a holding, for it seems to imply that the maximum rate of interest
a corporation may pay under the TMCLA is eighteen percent per annum.
The problem is that the TMCLA provision does not speak in terms of
eighteen percent per annum but rather of one-and-one-half percent per
month. 10 95 Indeed, since under the facts it appeared that seven-and-one-half
percent interest had been paid on the loan in advance, a strong argument
could be made that if all the advance interest had been paid at one time,
the payment was usurious because the seven-and-one-half percent paid obviously exceeded the one-and-one-half percent monthly ceiling. At least one
commentator has observed that because the TMCLA's rate ceiling is expressed in terms of monthly rather than annual interest, the statute makes
payment of any front-end charges extremely hazardous. 0 96 The prescience
of this warning has been borne out in a very recent Texas supreme court
decision modifying but affirming a court of civil appeal's holding that a corporation can recover statutory penalties allowed for usurious interest, thus directly contradicting the notion a corporation has no cause of action for usury.
1092. 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).

1093. "2. Usury [key number] 102(1). A corporation has no cause of action for
usury. Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. arts. 1302-2.09, 5069-1.02." Id.
1094. Id. at 337.
1095. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, corporations, domestic or foreign,
may agree to and stipulate for any rate of interest as such corporation may determine,
not to exceed one and one-half percent (11'A%) per month, on any bond, note, debt,
contract or other obligation of such corporation under which the original principal
amount is Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) or more .......
TEx. REv. Ov. STAT. ANN.
art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974).

1096. Loiseaux, supra note 1090, at 439.
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In W.E. Grace Manufacturing Co. v. Levin' 0 97 a creditor sued a corporation to recover the balance owing on indebtedness plus actual and exemplary
damages for fraud. The corporation counterclaimed to recover statutory penalties for usury, asserting $500 it had agreed to pay plaintiff as a "handling
charge" for an advance of $18,000 was usurious. The purpose of the advane was to enable defendant to obtain two mills it had sold to a third party
whose $25,000 check in payment would then be turned over to plaintiff to
repay the advance and handling charge as well as be applied on a $10,000
note defendant owed plaintiff. The usury claim was based on the fact that
the advance had been repaid twenty-two days later when the third party's
check for $24,7501098 was turned over to plaintiff. This meant the defendant
had paid $500 for the use of $18,000 for twenty-two days which amounted
to more than forty-five percent per annum and thus entitled the defendant
corporation to recover under the general usury law not only double the
amount of interest, or $1,000 plus its attorney's fees of $2,500,1099 but also
the $18,000 principal because the interest paid was more than double the
amount allowed by law. 1100
The trial court denied the counterclaim but was reversed by the Dallas
court of civil appeals."10 ' The latter ruled that the proceeds from the third
party's check should not all be allocated to principal, as plaintiff contended;
instead that part covering the $500 handling charge, having been intended
by the parties to be interest, must be considered as such, and being clearly
usurious under the TMCLA, the defendant corporation, or rather by now,
its trustee in bankruptcy, should have been allowed to recover the statutory
penalties for usury. As to the latter, the plaintiff argued that the statute
awarding the penalties applied only to interest greater than the amount
charged or allowed "by this Subtitle" (the general usury law), 1 0 2 and not
to interest which exceeded the amount that could be charged corporations
under the TMCLA. The court's response 1 0 3 was to note that the general
usury law also 'stated that "[a]11 contracts -for usury are contrary to public
policy and shall be subject to the appropriate penalties prescribed in Article
1.06 of this Subtitle."' 1 04 It was clear, therefore, the legislature intended the
statutory penalties to govern contracts for a greater amount of interest than
1097. 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1974), modifying Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace
Mfg. Co., 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).
1098. The third party had deducted $250 as a 1% discount for cash. 506 S.W.2d

at 582-83.
1099. "Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater
than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount
of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the
court. . . ." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (1971).
1100. "Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in excess
of double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as an additional
penalty, all principal as well as interest and all other charges and shall pay reasonable
attorney fees set by the court .... ." Id. art. 5069-1.06(2) (1971).
1101. Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1972), modified in W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.
1974).

1102. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
1103. 488 S.W.2d at 502.

ANN.

arts. 5069-1.01 to 1.06 (1971).

1104. Id., citing Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (1971)

court).

(emphasis by the
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allowed corporations under the TMCLA as well as apply to general usurious
transactions. 1 05
In modifying, the supreme court did not address itself directly to this analysis but obviously assumed its correctness when it stated: "Texas Tool is a
corporation, and corporations are now authorized to stipulate for any rate of
interest not in excess of 1/2 per cent per month on debts in the original principal amount of $5,000.00 or more. Art. 1302-2.09 V.A.T.S. The class of
persons who may be subjected to penalties for usury have been expanded
to include those who contract for usurious interest, and more severe penalties
have been prescribed. Art. 5069-1.06, V.A.T.S." 110 6 It also agreed the
handling charge should be considered as interest; however, inasmuch as the
parties' agreement was in terms of payment by the third party of $25,000
instead of the $24,750 check actually received, in its judgment, the $250 deficiency in the check should be deducted from the $500 interest charge,
meaning that only $250 had been received as interest on the $18,000 advance for twenty-two days. This still exceeded the one-and-one-half percent
maximum which could be recovered plus the $2,500 attorney's fees, but did
not exceed double the maximum rate so -as to require repayment of the principal as well. The court of civil appeal's judgment was thus reduced to
$3,000 and, as modified, affirmed.
As a result of the Grace decision, there can be no doubt that a Texas corporation can assert a claim for, and presumably a defense of usury when
charged interest in excess of the amount allowed in article 2.06 of the
TMCLA. At the same time, it is also evident the courts will assess the validity of the interest paid in terms of the one-and-one-half percent monthly figure rather than the total eighteen percent per annum apparently assumed as
proper in Sud v. Morris. This re-emphasizes Professor Loiseaux's warnings
of the dangers involved in paying "points" or other front-end charges based
on the latter assumption. The only solution, if the eighteen percent per
more expected and
annum is the desideratum, and it would seem to be the
110 7
conventional method of calculation, is legislative action.
1105. The court's conclusion would seem to allay the fears expressed by the student
writer in Comment, supra note 1090, that there is no provision by which a lender who

received usurious interest from a corporation could be punished because, as the writer
analyzed the statutes, the penalties prescribed in article 5069-1.06 were limited by their

terms only to those usurious transactions contravening the articles grouped under its subtitle. 8 HOUSTON L. REv. at 568-69. This of course was the same interpretation urged
by plaintiff and rejected by the court. Cf. Lafferty v. A.E.M. Developers & Builders
Co., 483 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972), error ref. n.r.e., discussed
in Larson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 67, 76

(1973), where a corporate borrower paying interest in excess of 20% recovered double
the usurious interest plus the principal paid; however, because the defendant had not
raised the possible applicability of TMCLA art. 2.09 in either the trial court or appellate

court, the court refused to consider the issue on his motion for rehearing.
1106. 506 S.W.2d at 583.
1107. At the time of this writing, the Usury Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the State Bar intends to propose an amendment to
TMCLA article 2.09 that will substitute 18% per annum for the present 1Y % per
month formula. It will also seek enactment of a new statute as TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
art. 5069-1.07 that will permit "spreading" or allocating over the term of a loan charges
included in the total amount of interest on the loan. The committee feels that while
such allocation has previously been permissible under Texas law, the decision in Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ.
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Corporate Purposes: International Trading. In a preceding section of this

Article it was noted that one of the 1973 amendments now allows a Texas
corporation to state as its purpose the transaction of any or all businesses for
110 8
Thus, the
which corporations can be incorporated under the TBCA.

Texas law has come almost full circle from the days when corporations were
limited to a single purpose that had to be selected from those authorized by
law. 1109 As a consequence, there has been virtually no litigation concerning
corporate purposes, especially since 1955 when the TBCA came into force
and permitted corporations to adopt almost any number or combination of
purposes their organizers desired."110

But in a recent Texas federal court

decision that arose from a threatened takeover of Texasgulf Inc., through a
tender offer made by Canada Development Corporation (CDC), the ghost of
the single purpose doctrine materialized in the form of an obscure Texas
statute permitting formation of an international trading corporation to become one of the major issues in a bitter court struggle by Texasgulf's management to enjoin CDC's tender offer.""'
In July 1973, CDC, a corporation owned by the Canadian government,
made an unexpected tender offer for approximately a third of the stock of
Texasgulf, a Texas corporation that had extensive mining operations in Canada. The response by Texasgulf's management was to seek a temporary restraining order which was granted, as well as temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the offer. The basis for the relief sought was an alleged violation of the Williams Act' 2 in failing to disclose, among other matApp.-Amarillo 1974), seemingly holds that a lender cannot spread front-end interest
charges over the life of a loan, thus allowing a corporate borrower to defend enforcement of the loan for usury and recover statutory penalties. Because the loan had been
made prior to enactment of TMCLA art. 2.09, the law in effect at the time was applied,
as the court in an earlier opinion had refused to give article 2.09 retroactive effect, see
Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc. v. Southwestern Investment Co., 476 S.W.2d 38
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Larson, supra note 1105,
at 7.5, and Lebowitz, supra note 166, at 120. Memorandum by John A. Barrett, Chairman, Committee on Usury of the Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law of
the State Bar of Texas on Proposed Amendments to Article 5069-1.02 and to Article
1302-2.09, addressed to the Council of the Section of Corporation, Banking & Business
Law of the State Bar of Texas, Sept. 10, 1974.
Given the emphasis in both opinions in W.R. Grace on testing any interest or other
charges paid on the 1%% standard, the committee will no doubt feel even greater urgency in seeking enactment of its proposals.
1108. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 3.02(A)(3) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in
text accompanying notes 82-89 supra.
1109. See note 82 supra.
1110. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.01 (Supp. 1974); see note 84 supra.
1111. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
1112. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(s), 78n(d)-(f) (1970)), amended by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-567, 84 Stat. 1497; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l to -4, schedule 13D, 240.14d-1 to
-4, schedule 14D (1974). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CoNTROL 64-146 (1973); H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §§ 13.19-.30 (1972); 1 A. BROMBERG, SCUmITIES LAw-FRAUD § 6.3
(1969); 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 730; R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURmEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 936 (3d ed. 1972); 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3658-69 (Supp. 1969); Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards
and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21 CASE WEs. L. REV. 613 (1970); Bromberg,
The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462 (1969); Brown, The Scope of
the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971); Griffin &
Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations
with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654 (1971); Hamilton, Some Reflec-
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ters, 111 that consummation of the tender offer would cause Texasgulf to violate article 1527 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes' 1 1 4 and the consequences
that would accrue therefrom. Article 1527 was enacted in 19211115 and
dealt largely with the powers of a corporation "created for the purpose of
engaging in international trading and the purchase and sale of the products
of the farm, ranch, orchard, mine and forest"' 1116 pursuant to subdivision 79
of former article 1302, the general statute that listed the permissible single
purposes for which Texas corporations could then be organized. 1117 However, the statute also provided that a majority of the stock of such corporations had to be owned by citizens of the United States and that a majority
of officers and directors must be both United States and Texas citizens.
Aliens were permitted to become stockholders "but the control of such corporations shall never in any instance be vested in citizens of other countries
than the United States."' 111 If so, a "violation of any provision herein as
to the control of stock of such corporation shall be sufficient for the Secretary
of State to cancel the charter of said corporation and the same shall be placed
in the hands of a receiver as provided by law."' 1119 Texasgulf contended that
it came within the purview of article 1527 and hence CDC's takeover if successful would violate the statute and would, then lead to cancellation of Texasgulf's charter and all of its assets being put into receivership. None of this
was divulged in CDC's tender offer as required by the Williams Act, but even
if it had been, the statute itself was sufficient grounds for equitable relief.
It therefore asked that a preliminary injunction be granted until a hearing
on the merits as to the applicability of article 1527 and the consequences
of its violation could be held.
Judge Seals of the Southern District of Texas, who conducted a lengthy
hearing on Texasgulf's complaint, refused to delay the tender offer on that
basis, feeling that all the evidence and arguments concerning article 1527's
applicability had been developed at the hearing. 1" 20 In his judgment, article
1527 did not apply to Texasgulf, primarily because it was not an international
tions on Cash Tender Oiler Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969); Wander, Selecting
Targets and Shaping Strategy in Corporate Take-Overs, 24 Sw. L.J. 593 (1970).
1113. CDC was also alleged to have failed to disclose (1) the purpose for which it
was organized and the conflict of interests it would have as Texasgulf's controlling
shareholder with non-Canadian shareholders; (2) its plans and proposal for changes of
management and possible spin-off of assets; (3) that it and others had entered into a
conspiracy to acquire Texasgulf's stock in violation of sections 13(d) and 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), 78n(e) (1972); (4) its acquisition of
control would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1972), and section
7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1972); (5) that upon consummation of the tender
offer Texasgulf would cease to be eligible for insurance, finance, and other programs
administered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 22 U.S.C. §
2191-2200a (Supp. 1974); (6) consummation of the tender offer would jeopardize radio
licenses held by Texasgulf, 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)(5) (Supp. 1974); (7) its control would
jeopardize Texasgulf's Australian mining venture. 366 F. Supp. at 386-87.
1114. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962).
1115. Ch. 120, §9 1-3, [1921] Tex. Laws 227 (presently codified as TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962)).
1116. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962).
1117. Id. art. 1302, subd. 79, repealed by ch. 229, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 458.
1118. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962).
1119. Id.
1120. 366F. Supp. at 411.
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trading corporation within the meaning of the statute. Historically, an international trading company was one, such as the British East India Company
and Hudson's Bay Company, that imported raw materials and native products
of newly discovered lands into Europe and exported manufactures. 1 2' They
were essentially intermediaries, not producers of the materials and products
they procured and sold. The Texas statute obviously had such companies
in mind in speaking of a corporation that would engage in international trading of the products of "farm, ranch, orchard, mine and forest." ' 1 22 The
emergency clause of the statute suggested that the legislature was interested
in assuring that the then abundant and surplus supply of raw materials in
Texas would find an adequate market. 1 23 Nothing in the statute indicated
it was designed to apply to a corporation such as Texasgulf, a multinational
natural resources corporation engaged primarily in mining and extraction and
the international sale of its own products. Nor was there anything approximating the language found in article 1527 in Texasgulf's original charter of
1909 when it was formed for the sole purpose of establishing and maintaining
an oil business nor in a 1963 amendment thereto adopting a broad purpose
clause reflecting its expanded activities.
Prior to the adoption of the TBCA, as Judge Seals correctly noted and
Texasgulf conceded, the issue could not have been raised because of the
single purpose rule Texas had and Texasgulf's selection of an oil company
purpose. But Texasgulf contended that after the TBCA permitted an expansion of corporate purposes, any corporation that adopted a general purpose
clause that could possibly be construed to include the trading of natural resources became automatically subject to article 1527. Judge Seals disagreed,
saying that article 1527 was designed to deal with a special type of corporation and that unless Texasgulf's purpose clause expressly included international trading, it would be a gross distortion of legislative intent to hold that
the statute governs a corporation that is essentially a producer with none of
the attributes of the traditional trading corporation. In essence, article 1527
was designed to deal with a specific type of corporation and owed its continuing existence after the TBCA was adopted to the belief by the Bar Committee
that it and similar statutes were so limited in their application they need not
be tampered with in a general business corporation act. 11 24 The committee
did not conceive that, or as Judge Seals cogently put it, the legislature could
1121. The court relied extensively on an affidavit by Professor Francis Scott Yeager
of the University of Houston College of Business giving the historical background of
such companies.
1122. Tax. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962).
1123. The emergency recited was "the fact there is now no adequate law in Texas
authorizing the creation of international trading corporations, and the further fact that
it is absolutely necessary in the interest of farmers, the ranchmen, and others engaged
in the business of producing raw materials in the State of Texas that such corporations
be created and brought into existence so that the vast quantity of raw materials now
in the hands of producers of the State of Texas find an adequate market." Ch. 120,
§ 5, [1921] Tex. Laws 228-29.
1124. See Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 9.15(B) (1956); Comments of Bar Committee to Arts. 9.14-.16; 3A TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 421-38 (1956); cf. Amsler, Report of Committee on Revision of Corporate Laws, 23 TEx. B.J. 327, 328 (1960), discussing a proposed Corporation Code in which article 1527 would be listed as part 12
of a separate chapter recodifying "existing statutes affecting particular corporations."
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not have intended that article 1527 was to become "a lurking monster applicable to any corporation which might draw a purpose clause broad enough
to include international trading in the products of mines-or the farm, ranch,
1125
or forest for that matter."
As the author of an affidavit supporting -the court's interpretation of the
Bar Commmittee's intentions that became the only item of evidence not considered on the issue because of Texasgulf's objection, to me the court's analysis seems eminently sound. 11 2 But to be as objective as possible, the
parochial philosophy reflected in article 1527 and its harsh penalties are
completely alien to that of the TBCA which seeks to liberalize the corporation law of Texas and encourage businesses to incorporate here. Thus,
there can be no doubt that had the Bar Committee considered the statute to be the "lurking monster" Judge Seals referred to, it would have sought
its repeal or specific exclusion from application to general business corporations. A majority of the committee have always been active practitioners,
some of whose corporate clients undoubtedly engaged in some aspect of international commerce. It is hard to believe that such a committee would have
taken no action with respect to a statute that would lead to automatic cancellation of any of those clients' charters if a majority of its directors and officers
proved not to be citizens of Texas." 27 As Judge Seals aptly stated, "so much
of the law is common sense."' "1 28 Certainly his decision with respect to article
1527 in this case exemplifies that observation.
Forfeiture of Charter. One consequence of failing to pay the Texas franchise
tax is suspension of the right to do business and ultimately forfeiture of the
corporation's charter. 1 29 But desiring not the death of the taxpayer but
rather the collection of his taxes, the Texas law also allows a corporation to
revive its existence by paying the back taxes, interest, and penalty. 13 0 In
Acme Color Art Printing Co. v. Brown" '8 the Dallas court of civil appeals
had to consider the question of whether a corporation whose charter had been
thus forfeited for nonpayment of franchise taxes but later reinstated can
maintain an action commenced before its reinstatement. The court held that
it could and that it was error to sustain a plea of abatement alleging forfeiture of charter when at the hearing the corporation presented a certificate
from the secretary of state showing its charter had been reinstated. The
court reasoned that the sole purpose of the franchise tax legislation is to raise
1125.

366F. Supp. at415.

1126. See id. at 381,411.
1127. Indeed, CDC contended that Texasgulf should be estopped from claiming the
benefits of a statute Texasgulf itself had been violating; allegedly a majority of its direc-

tors and officers were not citizens of Texas as required by article 1,527. Because of its
general ruling that Texasgulf was not subject to article 1527, the court did not pass on
the argument except to remark that it would have been one of several serious hurdles
that would have had to be cleared if article 1527 did pose a real threat to CDC's threatened takeover. Id.
1128. Id. at 415.
1129. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.17 (1969); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 7.01
(B)(1), (C), (D) (Supp. 1974).
1130. TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.17; Tx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.01(E)
(Supp. 1974); see Lebowitz, supra note 952, at 121.
1131.

488 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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revenue and that purpose is best served by encouraging the delinquent taxpayer to pay what it owes and thus revive its right to have access to the
courts. The decision is the first in Texas on the particular issue," 832 but is
34
consistent with other holdings in Texas 13 3 and elsewhere."C. Texas Securities Act
Legislative Changes. Two sections of the Texas Securities Act were
amended in 1973. One of the amendments was designed to strengthen the
criminal and administrative enforcement of the Act in curbing fraudulent
practices and abuses in the sale of municipal bonds and other exempt governmental securities. The other was to make clear that the Act's penal provisions apply to both securities and ,transactions otherwise exempted from registration under the Act. The changes were drafted by the State Bar Committee on Securities and Investment Banking in close cooperation with the Texas
Securities Board and Securities Commissioner, largely in response to their request for assistance in formulating ways of dealing with the municipal bond

problem.

113

Securities issued by federal and state governments and their agencies or
political subdivisions have traditionally been exempted from registration requirements of federal"13 6 and state"13 7 securities laws but generally not from
the anti-fraud provisions of such legislation." l38 Although the Texas Secu1132. Id. at 508.
1133. If the bar to bringing or maintaining a suit is due to forfeiture of the corporation's right to do business rather than its charter for non-payment of the franchise tax,
the Texas courts have held that revival of the right by paying back taxes and penalties
also revives the right to sue on actions whether accruing before or after forfeiture. See
TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (1969); Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Young-Lee Oil Co.,
122 Tex. 21, 28, 52 S.W.2d 56, 62 (1932); Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. Dildy,
92 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936), error ref.; cf. McGown v. Kittle,
480 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e, discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 952, at 122.
1134. See, e.g., Matanzas Packing Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 195 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir.
1952); Rooney v. Vermont Inv. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 351, 515 P,2d 297, 302, 110 Cal. Rptr.
353, 357 (1973); Town of Davie v. Hartline, 199 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. 1967); J.B.
Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind, 3 N.J. 312, 70 A.2d 72, 76 (1949). See generally 16A W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 7998; Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1220 (1950) (reinstatement of repealed, forfeited, expired, or suspended corporate charters as validating
acts in interim).
1135. Haynes, Texas Securities Act, 35 TEx. B.J. 1135 (1972).
1136. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1972). See
generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1112, §§ 1.02[41, 2.24[2]; 1 L. Loss, supra note
1112, at 560-66; H. SowARDs, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 3.03 (1974).
1137. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 4 (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 26 (1971);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110A, § 4(b) (1967); MINN. STAT. § 80.05(2) (1968); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 49:3-50(a)(1) (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-51(1) (1962); Tax. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-6(A) (1964); WIS. STAT. § 551.22 (Supp. 1974); see UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT § 402(a)(1). See generally H. BLOOMENThAL, supra note 1112,
§ 14.02; 1 L. Loss, supra note 1112, at 65-66; L. Loss & E. CowEr, BLUE SKY LAW,
Appendix I, at 352-53 (1958); J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS
PROMOTIONS 60 (1971).
1138. E.g., SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, Inc., [1972-73 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,756, at 93,300 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), permanent injunction
granted, SEC. REG. & L. REP,. No. 242, at A-17 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 1974); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Greenwich Say. Bank v. Shields, 131
F. Supp. 368, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); H. Montgomery Snyder, Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
77,996, at 80,189 (S.E.C. 1971); Walston & Co., Inc. and Harrington, 43 S.E.C. 508,
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rities Act recognizes a civil remedy for the fraudulent sale of an exempt security,1139 until 1973 there had been considerable doubt whether the penal
sanctions set out in section 29 would apply. 1 40 This was because sections
5 and 6, the provisions listing exempt transactions and exempt securities, respectively, each began by saying that "except as hereinafter in this Act specifically provided"' 1 4 ' the Act did not apply to such transactions or securities.
Since section 29 made no specific mention of either section, in contrast to
section 33(A)(2) providing a civil remedy for fraudulent offers or sales
"whether or not the security or transaction is exempt under Section 5 or 6
of this Act,"' " 142 the view of the Securities Board that the exemptions afforded
were only from registration requirements and not from prosecution" 43 was
certainly arguable at least. Moreover, even though section 23 of the Act specifically gave the Commissioner the right to issue cease and desist orders to
prevent the sale or proposed sale of securities that would work a fraud on
purchasers or would not be fair, just, or equitable irrespective of exemptions,
the sale of domestic governmental securities was expressly excluded from

such orders.1 4 4 The exclusion was probably inserted as a matter of comity
and practicality but raised no real enforcement problems until recent years.
Due to a proliferation of bonds and other obligations issued by local or special
governmental units these securities began to be sold or traded under extremely questionable circumstances and through high-pressure and deceptive
sales tactics by a small group of dealers operating outside the realm of estab1 45
lished and traditional municipal bond specialist firms.
The problem became the concern of the Texas Securities Board when a
number of small Texas banks fell victim to the improper trading practices
[1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,474 (1967). But cf. Securities
Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1972) (exempting sale of governmental
securities from civil liability). See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1112,
§§ 2.24[2], 8.05; 1 A. BROMBERO, supra note 1112, § 2.4(3); L. Loss & E. Cowrr,
supra note 1137, at 390; H. SowARDs, supra note 1136, § 3.01[11]; Robinson, The
Application of Federal Securities Laws to Municipal Financing, in PLI, MUNICIPAL
BOND PROBLEMS ADVANCED WORKSHOP 9, 20 (1969).
1139. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2),(1964).
1140. Haynes, supra note 1135, at 1135; cf. Bordwine, Criminal Liability Under the
Texas Securities Act, 35 TEx. B.J. 107, 112 (1972).
1141. TEx. REV. Crw. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-5, -6 (1964).
1142. Id. art. 581-33(A)(2).
1143. Haynes, supra note 1135, at 1135.
1144. Ch. 269, § 23, [1957] Tex. Laws 575.
1145. See, e.g., SEC v. The Senex Corp, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,735, at 96,441
(E.D. Ky., July 24, 1974) (complaint); SEC v. First United States Corp., SEC. REG.
& L. REP. No. 217, at A-10 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 1973) (complaint); SEC v. Investors
Associates of America, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,644
(W.D. Tenn. 1972) (complaint); SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, [1972-73
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,643 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (complaint);
Comptroller Warns of "Unethical" Municipal Bond Selling Practices, SEC. REG. &
L. REP. No. 115, at A-9 (Aug. 18, 1971); Comptroller of the Currency, Banking
Circular No. 2, Supp. No. 2 (Aug. 8, 1971), summarized in CCH FED. BANKING L.
REP. 1 49,202.15; Antifraud Violation Alleged Against Municipal Bond Dealers, SEc.
REG. & L. REP. No. 175, at A-8 (Oct. 26, 1972); Special Report: Bill Subjecting
Dealers and Banks Selling Municipals to SEC Regulation Is Passed By Senate, SEC
RE. & TRANSFER REP., Oct. 31, 1974, at 1, 3; Fraud Is Charged Against Paragon
Securities Co., Wall Street Journal, Aug. 8, 1973, at 8, col. 1 (Southwestern ed.);
Municipal Bond Dealers Discuss Establishment of Self-Regulatory Plan, Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 4, 1972, at 12, col. 4 (Southwestern ed.); Feasibility of Municipal Bond
Regulation Will Be Studied by an NASD Committee, Wall Street Journal, May 18,
1972, at 3, cols. 2, 3 (Southwestern ed.).
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of some of these new bond firms and their salesmen, nearly all operating from
outside the state. Such practices consisted, for example, of encouraging overtrading;" 4 6 misquoting bond ratings, coupon price, maturity, and yield; offering bonds at current yield price instead of true tax exempt yield; selling revenue bonds as general obligation unlimited tax bonds; breaking confirmed
trades because of market conditions or inability to procure delivery; and socalled "tailgating." In "tailgating," several firms work in conjunction with
each other by having the first firm offer the bonds at an extremely high price,
then others offer them at a reduced price, misleading the banker into thinking he is getting a bargain when in reality the sales price is still well above
market. Of course, such sales were not confined to Texas banks or financial
institutions and ultimately led to action by the SEC and other state blue sky
law agencies. 1 47 But in Texas, faced with the Texas Securities Act language
that effectively hamstrung enforcement, there was little that could be done.
New legislation was the obvious solution. First, section 23 was amended
to delete the exclusionary language so that now cease and desist orders can

be issued with respect to fraudulent or unfair sales of governmental as well
as other exempt or non-exempt securities or transactions." 148 Secondly, the
two most relevant subsections of section 29 were amended to make them ap-

plicable "whether or not the transaction or security is exempt under Sections
5 or 6 of this Act."' " 49 These were subsection C penalizing fraud or fraudulent practices in the sale of securities in Texas" 150 and subsection E providing
criminal sanctions for knowingly making or causing to be made any material
false or misleading statement in any document filed with the Commissioner
or in any proceeding under the Act. 15' In the process, the "fraud or fraudulent practice" language in subsection C was supplemented by adding rule
lOb-5's formulation of securities law fraud, 1152 thus permitting utilization of
that rule's tremendous body of judicial interpretation." 5 3a The whole section
was re-enacted so that former subsection H could become subsection G and
154
fill the gap left by former subsection G's repeal in 1963."
1146. Overtrading usually occurs in the following manner. A bank which owns
bonds carried on its books at cost but having a current market value below cost sells
such bonds at a price above market (normally at the price equivalent to book value).
The bank then purchases other bonds from the same broker (often having a longer maturity and higher yield) at a price above market in order to compensate the broker for
the loss on the bonds sold him by the bank and for his broker's fee. The bonds are
then recorded at the new cost above market and as a result recognition of the loss on
the bonds sold by the bank is deferred. The new bonds are placed on the bank's books
at a price above their true market value when purchased. Generally the bank's books
will not properly disclose all of these circumstances. See Comptroller of the Currency,
Banking Circular No. 2, supra note 1145.
1147. See authorities cited in notes 1138, 1145 supra.
1148. Ch. 97, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 216, amending TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 581-23(A) (Supp.1974).
1149. Ch. 97, § 2, [1973] Tex. Laws 217, amending TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 581-29(C), (E) (Supp.1974).
1150. TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 581-29(C) (Supp.1974).
1151. Id. art. 581-29(E).
1152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 1112;
W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INsIDER TRADING (1968).
1153. Haynes, supra note 1135, at 1136.
1154. Former subsection G penalized the knowing declaration, issuance or payment
of cash dividends out of any fund other than the actual earnings of the issuer or from
the lawful liquidation of its business. It was repealed at the initiative of the Committee
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Case Construction. Now and then some of the Texas courts of civil appeals
manage to come up with patent misconstructions of the Texas Securities
Act 1 55 as one of three recent cases construing the Act demonstrates. Section

34 of the Act became the latest victim of judicial misreading in Rowland
Corp. v. Integrated Systems Technology, Inc.,"1

56

a decision by the Waco

court of civil appeals that has been justly criticized not only for ignoring
precedent but also for being "wrong in terms of grammar, structure, history
1 57
and policy. "
Rowland Corporation brought an action to recover a commission promised
it in a letter agreement by Integrated Systems Technology (IST). IST
agreed to pay Rowland ten percent of all sums invested by certain named
individuals in a private placement of a note offering which -IST was making.
Although two of the named individuals invested a total of $85,000, IST refused to pay Rowland its commission. The trial court granted a summary
judgment against Rowland, which was not licensed as a Texas securities
dealer, on the ground that section 34 of the Act bars recovery of a commission by an unlicensed dealer or salesman." 158 Rowland contended that since
the private placement was an exempt transaction under section 5()" 159 the
section 34 bar did not apply.

The Waco court of civil appeals affirmed. In its brief one-page opinion
without citation of authority other than the Securities Act, the court began
by quoting the section 34 provision that a person or company cannot bring
an action to collect a commission or compensation for services rendered in
the sale or purchase" 110 of securities without proof of licensing as a dealer
on Securities and Investment Banking in the belief the provision had no place in a securities law, especially since nothing in it referred to other parts of the Act, and because
the subject matter was more effectively covered by TBCA articles 2.38 and 2.41, ch. 170,
§ 11, (1963] Tex. Laws 473; see Comment-1963 Amendment to Art. 581-29(G), lB
TEX.

REV.

Civ. STAT. ANN. 61 (1964).

1155. See, e.g., Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers, 465 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Beaumont), rev'd, 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971), discussed in Lebowitz, supra note
1085, at 112-15; Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Beaumont 1965), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small
Offerings of Corporate Securities-The Prohibitionon Advertisements, 20 Sw. L.J. 239
(1966), and in 4 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., Oct. 1965, at
1.
1156. 488 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
1157. Bromberg, Collectibility of Commissions on Exempt Transactions in Securities,
BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., Oct. 1973, at 3.
1158. TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-34 (1964).

11,59. Id. art. 581-5(I). The sale may have been exempt either because IST still
would not have had 35 security holders after taking the sale into account, or because
it had not sold securities not otherwise registered or exempt or sold in exempt transactions to more than 15 persons within the preceding twelve months. See generally 20 R.
HAMILTON, TExAs BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 758, at 297-302; Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537 (1964); Bromberg,
supra note 1155; Lebowitz, supra note 1085, at 131-39; Meer, A New Look at the Texas
Securities Act, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 680 (1965).
1160. This provision in unlike the other provisions of the Texas Securities Act, which
are specifically limited to offers or sales of securities and the protection of purchasers
and not to purchases or protection of sellers. See, e.g., Ham v. Blankenship, 194 F.2d
430, 431 (5th Cir. 1952); Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 628-29, 291 S.W.2d 704, 708
(1956); Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 474, 199 S.W.2d 146, 149 (1947); Fowler v.
Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 642, 161 S.W.2d 478, 481 (1942); Dunnam v. Dillingham, 345
S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961). Section 34 applies to actions to recover commissions for both purchases and sales of securities. Maddox v. Flato, 423
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or salesman and proof that the securities sold were registered at the time of
the sale. The section then adds: "[P]rovided, however, that this section
or provision of this Act shall not apply to the exempt transactions set forth
in Section 5 of this Act nor to the sale and purchase of exempt securities
listed in Section 6 of this Act, when sold by a registered dealer."' 6 ' 'In the
court's view, the italicized phrase applied to both the section 5 and section
6 exemptions, although incongruously it then stated: "The non-application
of requirement that plaintiff maintaining action for commission have license,
is thus dependent on the sale of exempt securities being made by a registered
dealer." 11 62 This of course is what the statute says: a commission for the
sale of an exempt security cannot be recovered unless the sale is made by
a registered dealer. But here the issue concerned an exempt transaction, not
the sale of an exempt security. Nevertheless, the court concluded that because the sale had not been made by a registered dealer, the plaintiff could
not recover its commission.
Professor Bromberg has written an excellent critique of the Rowland
opinion 1 6 and much of the analysis given here reflects his views. To begin
with, the effect of the court's grammatical construction of the proviso is to
make it read that the section 34 bar will not apply "to the exempt transactions set forth in Section 5 . . . when sold by a registered dealer." Since
dealers obviously do not sell transactions, it is quite apparent the phrase
"when sold by a registered dealer" was intended only to modify the sales and
1 64
purchases of exempt securities by such dealers.
This interpretation is supported by section 6 of the Act which lists the various securities which are exempted from registration "when offered for sale,
or sold, or dealt in by a registered dealer or salesman of a registered
dealer." 165 In contrast, section 5 which deals with exempt transactions,
states that unless otherwise provided, a sale of securities does not come under
the Act when made in one of the transactions and under the conditions specified "and the company or person engaged therein shall not be deemed a
dealer within the meaning of this Act." 16 6 However, the Act does require
that certain exempt transactions, mainly those affecting the investing public,
be conducted through a registered dealer. These include, for example, secondary trading in outstanding securities 1 67 or private offering of oil and gas
securities when limited to no more than thirty-five sales within a twelvemonth period. 1 6 8 On the other hand, the Act's silence as to the need for
S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in
Amsler, supra note 1090, at 104; Shriver v. Stoddard, 188 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1945), error ref.
1161. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-34 (1964) (emphasis added). The legislative history and derivation of section 34 are traced in Maddox v. Flato, 423 S.W.2d 371,
374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967).
1162. 488 S.W.2d at 134 (emphasis added).
1163. See Bromberg, supra note 1157.
1164. Id. at 3.
1165. TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-6 (1964).
1166. Id. art. 581-5.
1167. Id. art. 581-5(0). See generally Meer, supranote 1159, at 698.
1168. Id. art. 581-5(Q). See generally Fleming & Joor, Oil and Gas Interests as Securities Under the Federal and Texas Securities Acts, 5 BULL. OF THE SECION ON CORP.,
BANKING

& Bus. L., Nov. 1966, at 1, 3.
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utilizing a registered dealer in the other exempt transactions listed, including
section 5(I), the general private offering exemption relied on by plaintiff,
strongly supports the inference that these sales may be conducted by an unlicensed dealer. This rather broad exclusion of exempt transactions, but not
exempt securities, from the dealer registration requirement reflects a legislative policy that those who deal in securities whether exempt or not which
may be sold to the public or engage in public transactions should be licensed.
On the other hand, those who participate in transactions that are essentially
private in nature and which do not constitute the conduct of a securities business need not be licensed. Thus, since the legislature "decided not to require
licenses for most exempt transactions, it could hardly have intended by § 34
to impose gratuitous service on all those who participate in them." 1169 The
Waco court's conclusion that this in effect is what section 34 does impose
simply cannot be justified. It flies in the face of not only the general understanding among the securities bar concerning the meaning of section 341170

(admittedly not authoritative), but more importantly the body of 171
precedent
that directly or inferentially supports the accepted interpretation.
If the Rowland opinion could be passed off as an aberrant construction
not likely to be followed, there would be no cause for concern. But given
the infrequency with which the Securities Act is interpreted, any case construction of its provisions becomes important when it unsettles the policies
and philosophy of regulation the Act is designed to effectuate and causes uncertainty as to the validity of certain securities transactions. Moreover, as
Professor Bromberg points out, 1172 the decision can have a number of unexpected results. Because section 34 somewhat expansively refers to compensation as well as commissions for services rendered in the sale or purchase
of securities, its terms might well encompass a lawyer or accountant who must
sue for his work in connection with a private placement. Non-Texas dealers
not licensed here who arrange for sales to institutional investors in Texas as
exempted in section 5(H) 1173 could not recover their commissions in Texas
courts. Even executors or administrators arranging for the sale of securities,
as permitted in section 5(A), 1174 may face legal objections to the collection
of fees for their services in connection with the sale. Similarly, compensation
paid employees of an issuer of exempt securities for their work in selling its
securities might be questioned even though the sale is exempted by section
5(R).11 75
1169.

Bromberg, supra note 1157, at 3.

1170. Id.
1171. E.g., Gerchsheimer v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 437 F.2d 1332,
1335 (10th Cir. 1971), discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 1085, at 126 (recovery of com-

mission by unlicensed dealer in section 5(H) transaction); see Winslow v. Boyd, 195
S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946) (recovery of compensation under
section 5(C) and predecessor of section 5(I)); cf. Development Inv. Corp. v. Diversa,
Inc., 393 S.W.2d 653, 656-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965); Tumblewood Bowling

Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965), error ref. n.r.e.;
Flournoy v. Gallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108, 110-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945); see
Bromberg, supra note 1157, at 3.
1172. Bromberg, supra note 1157, at 4.
1173. TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(H) (1964).
1174. Id. art. 581-5(A).

1175. Id. art. 581-5(R).

1974]

TEXAS CORPORATION LAW

It is apparent the cure for the actual and potential harm created by Rowland must come from the legislature. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to learn that the State Bar Committee on Securities and Investment
Banking has proposed an amendment to section 34 that will correct the Waco
court's erroneous construction" 17 6 and make clear once and for all that registration as a dealer is not required as a prerequisite to a recovery of commissions in an exempt transaction. The proposal, however, would go one step
further and also make the section 34 bar inapplicable to an action for commissions or compensation in the sale of any security exempted by section 6.
1 177
But this would effect no real change in the law because, as noted earlier,
the exemption afforded the securities listed in section 6 is conditioned upon
their being offered for sale or being sold or being dealt in by a registered
dealer or its salesman. Nevertheless it was thought best to eliminate the concluding "when sold by a registered dealer" phrase from section 34 altogether,
no doubt to be doubly sure some other court of civil appeals will not come
up with the same result as Rowland.
The second of the securities law cases suggests another possible way in
which the Waco court might have erred in its decision. The facts in Rowland are so succinctly stated that it is difficult to tell, but it is conceivable
that Rowland may have done no more than locate and determine the interest
of the private placees named in the agreement who then directly negotiated
the terms of the private placement with IST. If so, Rowland's role may not
have been at all that of a broker or dealer required to be registered under
the Texas Securities Act, but rather that of a finder, who, as held in Rogers
v. Ellsworth,"1 78 need not be licensed at all.
In the Rogers case, the defendant, a majority shareholder of an exploration
company, indicated to plaintiff, a broker or finder of business opportunities
in the geophysical exploration industry, that he wanted to sell out, preferably
to a corporation that would operate his company as a subsidiary or merge
with it. The two agreed that plaintiff would try to interest various prospects,
and ultimately all of the defendant's shares were sold to one such prospect,
an electronics corporation. Even so, the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff the agreed finder's fee of three percent of the gross sales price and plaintiff brought suit. The defendant responded that because plaintiff was not
a licensed securities dealer, he was barred from recovering his commission
under section 34.1179

The plaintiff, however, claimed he had not sold secu-

1176. Memorandum Re Proposed Amendments to the Texas Securities Act Recommended by the Council of the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law and
Its Securities Committee to the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas for Inclusion in the Legislative Package to be Sponsored by the State Bar at the 1975 Regular
Session of the Texas Legislature, at 6, enclosed in letter dated June 17, 1974, from
Fletcher L. Yarbrough, Chairman of Committee on Securities and Investment Banking
to Richard D. Haynes, Chairman, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law.
As proposed, the proviso at the end of section 34 would read: "provided, however,
that this section or provision of this Act shall not apply (1) to any transaction exempted
by Section 5 of this Act, nor (2) to the sale or purchase of any security exempted by
Section 6 of this Act."
1177. See text accompanying note 1165 supra.
1178. 501 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.

1179. TEx. REv. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art. 581-34 (1964).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

rifles but simply acted as the finder of a business opportunity. Although no
issue was submitted as to whether the contract contemplated the sale of securities, the jury found that plaintiff had set in motion the events that led to
the sale and that a contract to pay a commission existed. The trial court
then awarded plaintiff a judgment on the verdict.

The Houston (14th District) court of civil appeals affirmed. It granted
that a basic element of the plaintiff's case had not been submitted, i.e.,
whether the contract contemplated or involved the sale of securities. Even
so, no objection was raised and the issue would therefore be regarded as a
deemed issue under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure118 ° as long as there
was proper ground of recovery. While no Texas cases had previously distinguished between a broker and a finder, the distinction had been impliedly
recognized. 11 8 ' A finder, the court said, "is an intermediary who contracts
to find and bring parties together, but he leaves the ultimate transaction to
the principals; he is the procuring cause, and his function ceases when negotiations between the principals begin.""118 2 Since the verdict inferred no sale
of securities had been involved, the rule would apply that a finder is not pre-

cluded from recovering compensation for having located a buyer or seller
even if he is not licensed as a real estate or securities dealer." 8 3
The holding in Rogers is somewhat less than satisfying in view of the faulty
issue submission as to the nature of the transaction. In a somewhat similar
case". 84 plaintiff sued for a commission he alleged he had been promised to
locate a buyer for some stock in a Texas corporation. A buyer was finally
obtained through the efforts of a stock brokerage firm that plaintiff had asked
to assist him, but the plaintiff never knew the identity of the buyer. The
1180. TEx. R. Civ. P. 279. See generally G. HODES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN
190-222 (1959); 3 R. McDoNALD, TFXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.36.4 (1970); Dooley, Special Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 32, 38
(1941); 29 TExAs L. REv. 537 (1951); 23 TxAs L.REV. 189 (1945).
1181. Cf. Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 335 S.W.2d 584 (1960), an action to recover
a commission for procuring a buyer for motor freight properties. Issues were raised that
TEXAS

should have been submitted as to whether the transaction involved the sale of realty and
securities so as to bar plaintiff's recovery in that he was not licensed as either a real
estate broker or securities dealer. It was held that since the issues were not submitted
nor had the trial court made any findings of fact, the case would have to be remanded.
On remand, the trial court found the contract did not contemplate or include the sale
of securities, thus inferring plaintiff must have rendered his services in another capacity,
i.e., as a finder. D.C. Hall Transp., Inc. v. Hard, 355 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth), error ref. n.r.e., 358 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1962) (per curiam).
1182. 501 S.W.2d at 757. See also Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 507 P.2d 65,
70, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766 (1973); Modem Tackle Co. v. Bradley Indus., 11 Ill. App.
3d 582, 297 N.E.2d 688, 692 (1973); Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1164 (1969) (validity,
construction, and enforcement of business opportunities or "finder's fee" contract).
1183. E.g., C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. Sherrill-Noonan, Inc., 261 F.2d 269, 274 (3d
Cir. 1958) (applying Pennsylvania law); Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 507 P.2d
65, 69, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1973); Seckendorf v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 229 App.
Div. 318, 241 N.Y.S. 300 (1930); see Annot., supra note 1182, at 1173; cf. South Umpqua Mining Co., 3 S.E.C. 233, 241 (1938) (finder not an underwriter); 3 L. Loss, supra
note 1112, at 1299, 4 id. at 2581; WHEN CORPORaAONs Go PUBLIC 36-40 (C. Israels
& G. Duff eds. 1962). Contra, e.g., Corson v. Keane, 4 N.J. 221, 72 A.2d 314, 317
(1950); Afford v. Raschiatore, 163 Pa. Super. 635, 63 A.2d 366, 369 (1949); Chapman
Co. v. Service Broadcasting Corp., 52 Wis. 2d 32, 187 N.W.2d 794, 800 (1971); see
Annot., supra note 1182, at 1172.
1184. Gerchsheimer v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 437 F.2d 1332 (10th
Cir. 1971) (applying Texas law), discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 1085, at 126.
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court in permitting plaintiff to recover seemed to assume he had been acting
as a securities dealer or broker who was excused from alleging or proving
he had been licensed only because the transaction was exempt under section
5(H).11 85 Moreover, the definition of a dealer in the Texas Securities Act
to include one who invites offers for securities or who deals with them in any
other manner may be sufficiently broad to cover the activities of a business
opportunity broker or finder since not infrequently such opportunities manifest themselves, as in Rogers, in the form of an acquisition consummated for
shares or other securities rather than through a purchase of assets. There
would appear to be as much need for licensing such brokers or finders who
actively engage in their vocation on a full- or part-time basis as there is for
registration of real estate brokers 11s6 or securities dealers. Whether their regulation should be subsumed under either licensing law or provided for sepa87
rately deserves legislative consideration."
The third securities law case, Bierschwale v. Oakes," 88 involved section
33, the civil liabilities provision of the Texas Securities Act. In a novel interpretation, the court of civil appeals construed that section so as to encompass
a constructive trust among the remedies afforded. The facts of the case are
somewhat involved, as is the court's opinion; consequently only those aspects
needed to explain the securities law issues are given here.
The principal actor in the law suit was the defendant Oakes. He had gotten control of a wholesale hardware firm through the medium of Southern
Investors, a shell corporation, by pursuing a plan of financing that resulted
in the assets of the hardware company being used to pay for the controlling
shares held by Southern." 8 9 A few months later Oakes sold his shares in
Southern to three associates in the hardware firm in return for a series of
1185. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(H) (1964) (exempting sales to institutional investors or registered dealers).
1186. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 19 (1969).
1187. Cf. N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW § 5-701, subd. 10 (McKinney 1964), the New York
statute of frauds, that requires a contract to pay compensation for negotiating the sale
of a business opportunity or business or an interest therein "including a majority of the
voting stock interest in a corporation" to be in writing. Because of ambiguity in its
terms, the statute was amended in 1964 to specifically include finders by defining negotiating to include the procuring of an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the negotiation or consummation of the transaction. Ch. 561, [1964] N.Y.
Laws; see Minichiello v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 521, 223 N.E.2d 793,
277 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
1188. 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974). The Texas Supreme Court, in
reversing, specifically declined to reach the issues under the Texas Securities Act. 516
S.W.2d at 130. See note 1193 infra.
1189. Oakes had Southern Investors take over a control block of stock in the hardware company which he had previously acquired and assume a bank loan he had obtained to finance the acquisition. He then had the hardware company borrow $850,000,
secured by a pledge of its inventory, accounts receivable, and fixed assets, from which
its debts were paid. The hardware company then sold a warehouse and inventory in
Galveston for $297,000, the proceeds of which were used to redeem most of its outstanding common stock for $278,518.31. Finally, the hardware company loaned Southern Investors $50,000 with which it purchased the remaining control stock. Id. at 512. For
somewhat similar bootstrap financing arrangements, see, e.g., Manney & Co. v. Texas
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), discussed in Le-

bowitz, Recent Texas Decisions in Corporation,Banking and Business Law, 5 BuLL. OF

& Bus. L., June 1967, at 1, 2; Milam v. Cooper Co.,
258 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953), error ref. n.r.e.
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ninety-three promissory notes each in the amount of $2,000, payable $30 per
month. Shortly thereafter Oakes approached Meadows, a real estate broker,
and told him he was interested in trading some of the notes for income producing property. Meadows showed him an apartment complex owned by
Bierschwale and the other plaintiffs which Oakes ultimately purchased in exchange for forty-seven of the notes with another twelve being given to
Meadows as his commission on the sale. During the course of the negotiations Oakes represented to the plaintiffs that the hardware company, whose
shares along with Southern's secured the notes, was a good, money-making,
well-managed business, and provided them with a condensed financial statement which Oakes claimed had been taken from the most recent audited
statement that showed assets in excess of two million dollars and a surplus
of $442,449. He did not tell them the hardware company had lost almost
a million dollars in the past five years and that he had withdrawn large sums
of money from the company while he managed it. After the deal was closed,
only two payments were made on the notes and the hardware company ultimately went into bankruptcy. In the meantime, Oakes conveyed the apartment property to a wholly owned corporation, 'United Properties, Inc., which
in turn sold the apartments to one Goldman for $40,000 in cash and twentyfour notes totalling almost $94,000 for the balance.
Bierschwale and the other plaintiffs sued Oakes and United to impose a
constructive trust on the cash and notes received from the sale to Goldman,
based on their equitable right to rescission and the statutory rescission remedy
provided by section 33. There were a number of jury findings, the most important of which found that Oakes had transferred the notes to the plaintiffs
by means of untrue statements of material facts but that while plaintiffs did
not know such statements were untrue they could have known they were in
the exercise of reasonable care. The trial court nevertheless rescinded the
exchange agreement for fraud in the procurement, and imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the property by United to Goldman,
including cash received and the Goldman notes.
The Houston (First District) court of civil appeals affirmed, although
modifying the judgment with respect to Meadows, who had intervened, and
the lien holders on the property. 1190 Despite the jury finding that plaintiffs
through due diligence could have learned that Oakes' statements were untrue,
there was ample basis on general equitable grounds for recission for fraud
1190. The trial court had awarded Meadows and his wholly owned corporation a constructive trust on the portion of the proceeds represented by the notes they had received
by way of commission and had made certain of the notes given to the plaintiffs subject
to liens of others to whom notes had been pledged by Oakes. The court of civil appeals
ruled that Meadows and his company were not entitled to have the trust imposed because they had not owned or had any interest in the apartments used as consideration
for their acquisition nor had they purchased the notes from Oakes. Instead the notes
had been purchased by the plaintiffs (who were awarded title to all the notes) and had
been transferred to Meadows as a matter of convenience. 497 S.W.2d at 521. The supreme court later reversed on this point and held that Meadows should share in the constructive trust res, as adjudged by the trial court. 516 S.W.2d at 132. As to the
pledgees, the plaintiffs were ruled to have a superior equity as lien creditors as to proceeds paid on the notes by Goldman because the pledgees had not perfected their security interest under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, Thx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. §§ 9.203, 9.301(c) (Supp. 1974). 497 S.W.2d at 525-26.
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because there was no showing the plaintiffs knew of the untruth or had
knowledge of any facts that would cause a reasonable, prudent person to
make inquiry since in general there is no duty on the part of a defrauded party
to investigate the truth or falsity of statements made to him unless he knows
facts that should reasonably lead to an inquiry. 1191 Oakes conceded that if
there had been fraud, a constructive trust on the Goldman notes would have
been proper, but argued that by imposing a trust on the balance of the proceeds plaintiffs were being awarded more than the damage they actually suffered. The court in response applied the basic principles enunciated in the
Restatement of Restitution that one who becomes a constructive trustee of
property he has acquired by fraud has a duty to reconvey the property and
if he wrongfully disposes of the property and profits therefrom he can be com1 92
pelled to surrender the profit as well to prevent unjust enrichment.
The court next considered whether recovery could be had under the Texas
Securities Act. 1193 There was no question the notes were securities under
the Act; 19 4 hence the civil liabilities imposed by section 33 were available"19 5
if its terms were satisfied. Section 33(A) provides two primary bases for
recovery that parallel those in the Uniform Securities Act" 96g and section 12
of the Securities Act of 1933, l 197 from which it -isderived." 98 Section 33(A)(1) gives a purchaser a civil action for so-called "technical violations,"' "1 99
i.e., offers or sales of securities that contravene sections 7 and 9 (registration
of securities), 12 (registration of dealers and salesman or agents of dealers),
23(B) (improper advertising) or orders the Securities Commissioner issues
under section 23(A) to prevent fraud. 1200 Section 33(A)(2) covers offers
and sales, whether the securities or transaction are exempted or not, "by
means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
1191. E.g., Isenhower v. Bell, 365 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1963); Wise v. Anderson,
163 Tex. 608, 611, 359 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1962); Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 158 Tex. 397, 312 S.W.2d 197 (1957); Moore v. Beakley, 215 S.W. 957, 958 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1919), holding approved; Rattan v. Bosley, 446 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
1192. RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION § 151, comment f at 604, § 160, comment d
at 643, comments g-i at 647-49 (1937).
1193. In a very recent opinion, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
judgment, primarily on the basis that Meadows should share in the constructive trust
res with Bierschwale. The supreme court upheld imposition of the constructive trust,
but expressly declined to reach the issues raised under the Texas Securities Act. 516
S.W.2d at 132. The explicit discussion of the Act by the court of civil appeals would
thus appear to remain pertinent despite the reversal, and the detailed discussion is included here for that reason.
1194. TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (1964) ("The term 'security' or 'securities' shall include any note or other evidence of indebtedness .... "). See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1112, § 2.03; 1 L. Loss, supra note 1112, at 546.
1195. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A) (1964). See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BuSINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 757, at 296; Bordwine, Civil Remedies Under
the Texas Securities Laws, 8 HousToN L. REV. 657, 660 (1971); Meer, supra note 1159,
at 701.
1196. UNIFORM SEcuRrriEs ACT § 410; see L. Loss & E. COwETr, supra note 1137,
at 389.
1197. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1972).
1198. Comment-1963 Amendment to Art. 581-33, 1B TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
69 (1964); see L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 1137, at 390; Lebowitz, supra note
1085, at 116 n.163.
1199. Comment, supra note 1197, at 70; Bordwine, supra note 1195, at 660.
1200. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(1) (1964).
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a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading (when the person buying the security does not know of the untruth or
omission, and who in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known
of the untruth or omission) . ' 1201 Given the jury's finding that the plaintiffs
had not exercised reasonable care in determining if Oakes' statements were
untrue, 120 2 it was obvious there could be no recovery under the latter ground
and the court so ruled.
This still left section 33(A)(1). Admittedly the notes were not registered
as securities under sections 7 and 9 nor was Oakes licensed under section
12 to sell them. Oakes contended, however, that the transaction was exempted by section 5(C)(1) which provides that the Act (except where
otherwise specified) does not apply to any sale "made by or in behalf of a
vendor . . . in the ordinary course of bona fide personal investment of the
personal holdings of such vendor, or change in such investment, if such
vendor is not engaged in the business of selling securities and the sales are
isolated transactions not made in the course of repeated and successive transactions of a like character .... ,1-03 The jury found Oakes was not in the
business of selling securities and that he had transferred the notes to the
plaintiffs in the ordinary course of his bona fide personal investments, but
failed to find that the transfer was an isolated transaction not made in the
course of repeated and successive similar ones. For this reason the exemption was not available, thus allowing an action to lie under section 33(A)(1). It is not clear from the opinion whether the jury made a specific finding the transaction was not an isolated one or whether the special issue submitted to it failed to inquire about this needed element. However, there was
some evidence that Oakes had taken over several corporations in a similar
manner and he was specifically asked what disposition he had made of the
stocks he had acquired in those companies. Apparently this was sufficient
in -the court's view to raise an issue of fact as to whether or not the sale was
made in the course of repeated and successive transactions of the same character.
Having determined there was civil liability under section 33, the court concluded the remedy it affords would not preclude relief by way of a constructive trust. Section 33(A) states specifically that a purchaser suing under its
provisions may sue either in law or in equity to recover the consideration he
paid for the securities purchased if he still owns them or for damages if he
does not. In essence, the statute provides for an equitable action for rescission that should be governed by the same general principles of equity as the
historic remedy. Here the consideration the plaintiffs gave Oakes for the
notes they purchased was the apartment property he later disposed of; it was
1201. Id. art. 581-33(A)(2).
1202. The effect of the parenthetical language quoted in the text would appear to
place the burden of proof on the purchaser to show he could not have reasonably known
of the untruth or omission and this seemed to be the basis for the court's holding that
the jury finding would not support a recovery under section 33(A) (2). See Comment,
supra note 1197, at 69. But cf. Bordwine, supra note 1195, at 661, treating the parenthetical language as a defense which the seller-defendant can utilize. Given the statutory language, the first interpretation is more sound.
1203. TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 581-5(C)(1) (1964).
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only equitable, therefore, that they be permitted to gain restitution by tracing
and imposing a constructive trust on the proceeds of that disposition as part
of their section 33 remedy.

Despite its uniqueness, the result in Bierschwale is a salutary one. It conforms to the generally accepted conception of the equitable nature of the statutory civil remedy provided by securities regulation. 12 0 4 It -also makes the
particular point that in encouraging private enforcement of the securities
has provided need not be limited to recovery
laws, the relief the legislature
1 205
of a money judgment.

1204. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 1112, at 1635, 1700; cf. A. BRoMnERo, supra note
1112, §§ 9.1-.2.
1205. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1940);
Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 1955); Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (D. Del. 1943); cf. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling
Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 1112,
at 1805; H. SOWAIWS, FEDERAL SEcuRmEs ACT § 9.04[5] (1974).

